REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, MARITIME AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Accident Investigation Board

Report on the Investigation of The Collision Between M/V GÖKBEL and M/V LADY AZIZA

ITALY / Off Ravenna Port

28 December 2014

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This report is prepared by the Accident Investigation Board.

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PURPOSE

The main purpose of investigating a marine accident is to identify the factors causing the accident, with the aim of improving the safety of lives of personnel and passengers at sea, preventing similar accidents in the future and enhancing safety of navigation. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor to apportion blame to anyone or any party.

NOTE

This marine accident is investigated in accordance with the Bylaw on the Investigation of Marine Accidents, which came into force after being published in the Official Gazette with reference number 26040 on 31st December 2005 and the Bylaw on the Investigation of Marine Accidents and Incidents which came into force after being published at the Official Gazette No.29056 on 10th July 2014 and which revoked the former Bylaw. This report is not written with apportionment of liability in mind and is not intended to be used in court of law. It endeavor's to identify and analyze the relevant safety issues pertaining to the specific accident, and to make recommendations aimed at preventing similar accidents in the future.

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ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

VDR	*:Voyage Data Recorder*
AIS	*:Automatic Identification System)*
VHF	*:Very High Frequency*
ISM Code	*: International Safety Management Code*
DPA	*: Designated Person Ashore*
SMC	*: Safety Management Certificate*
DOC	*: Document of Compliance*
SMS	*: Safety Management System*
STCW	*: Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping*
GPS	*: Global Positioning System*
ECDIS	*: Electronic Chart Display And Information System*
IMO	*:International Maritime Organization*
GT	*:Gross Tonnage*
COLREGS 72	*:Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972*
SOLAS	*:Safety Of Life At Sea*
BRM	*:Bridge Resource Management*
EPIRB	*: Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon*
SART	*: Search and Rescue Transponder*
GMDSS	*: Global Maritime Distress and Safety System*

SUMMARY

Picture 1[1]: *Location of the accident*

All times in the report are local times (GMT+1).

Turkish registered dry cargo vessel GÖKBEL and Belize registered dry cargo vessel LADY AZIZA collided in 2,5 miles east of Italy / Ravenna port entry on 28.12.2014 at 08:37:58. As a result of the collision, GÖKBEL sank while LADY AZIZA experienced minor damage.

GÖKBEL unloaded half of barite cargo from İskenderun port of Turkey at Salerno port of Italy and dropped anchor on 27.12.2014 at the anchoring area of Ravenna port to unload the remaining the cargo of 1500 tons. GÖKBEL started to navigate towards the Ravenna pilot embarkation station by heaving up anchor on 28.12.2014 at about 08:01. Meanwhile, completing the unloading of its cargo at Ravenna port, LADY AZIZA started the port leaving manoeuvers upon the boarding of the harbor pilot. The harbor pilot left from vessel at 08:22, the ship started to navigate towards Nogaro port of Italy.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adriatic_Sea

As a result of collision of LADY AZIZA with stem post to portside of hold number 1 of GÖKBEL at 08:37:58 to 2,5 miles east of Ravenna port entry, GÖKBEL started to leak and sank. Having a minor damage in the accident, LADY AZIZA was berthed back to Ravenna port in the scope of the started inquest.

6 of the 11 victim personnel of the GÖKBEL were rescued as a result of search and rescue activities carried out by Italian authorities, but one of them lost his life before reaching the coast. The remaining 5 accident victims were lost in the sea. While the corpses of 4 of these accident victims were found at Italian coasts in different times, 1 accident victim is still missing.

PART 1 – FINDINGS OF THE ACCIDENT

1.1 SHIPS and ACCIDENT INFORMATION

1.1.1 GÖKBEL Ship's Information

Name of Ship	: M/V GÖKBEL
Flag	: Turkish
Built At / On	: Balıkesir, Turkey / 2011
Port of Registry	: İstanbul
Type of Ship	: Dry Cargo Ship
Owner of Ship	:Ö. Çetinkaya Denizcilik Transport ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.
Gross Tonnage	: 2126
Net Tonnage	: 1143
DWT	: 3335
IMO No	: 9605712
Call sign	: TCZY4
Overall length	: 87.00 m.
Width	: 12.30 m.
Depth	: 6.85 m.
Draft	: 5.46 m.
Main Engine	: SKL/ 864 kw
Number of Crew	: 11
Previous Port	: Salerno / ITALY
Destination Port	: Ravenna / ITALY

Picture 2: *M/V GÖKBEL*



Figure 1: *GÖKBEL General Arrangement Plans*

1.1.1 LADY AZİZA Ship’s Information

Name of Ship	: M/V LADY AZİZA
Flag	: Belize
Built At / On	: Germany/ 1991
Port of Registry	: Belize
Type of Ship	: Dry Cargo Ship
Owner of Ship	: KHM SHIPPING CO.LTD.
Gross Tonnage	: 3828
Net Tonnage	: 2016
DWT	: 4452
IMO No	: 8917716
Call sign	: V3UL
Overall length	: 97.34 m.
Width	: 16.00 m.
Depth	: 8 m.
Main Engine	: WARTSILA VASA /2960 kw
Number of Crew	: …
Previous Port	: Ravenna / ITALY
Destination Port	: Nogaro/ ITALY

Picture 3: *M/V LADY AZİZA*

1.1.3 Accident Information

Date and Hour	:	28 December 2014 / 08:37:58 (GMT +1)
Location of Accident	:	ITALY/ 2,5 Miles East of Ravenna Port Entry
Coordinates of Accident Location	:	44° 29′ 54.18″ N - 012° 22′ 20.57″ E
Death / Loss	:	5/1 (GÖKBEL)
Pollution	:	NONE

1.1.4 Weather and Sea Conditions

At the time of the accident, the wind was blowing at the region from west, northwest with a force of 11 m/s (Beaufort: 10,8-13,8) and wave height was 4 meters. The weather is foggy and there was rain mixed with snow. Visibility was restricted. Sea water temperature was +9 degrees and air temperature was +1.3 degrees. In addition, there was a flow of about 3 nautical miles out of Ravenna port from North to South.

The condition of visibility prior to the accident was stated as “A dense fog started after starting the port leave manoeuver. The fog continued alongside the channel and after the disembarkation of the harbor pilot.” in the deck log book records of LADY AZIZA.



Date : 28th DEC Day of : SUN 2014 Page No : 25

Barom بارومتر	Air temp حرارة الهواء	Sea Temp حرارة البحر	Remarks ملاحظات
			S.B.G 0630 0720 P.O.B 0810 PILOT LIFT AFTER START MANOVRING AND WHILE PROCEEDING THE CHANNEL START HEAVY FOG. AND AFTER PILOT LIFT CONTINUE

NE REVS

ning time عدد أيام ال	Speed السرعة	Distance per log Error.per cent Magnetic variation
ay	Average Total	

PROCEEDING WITH AZL BRIDGE NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT WORKING IN GOOD CONDITION.
AT ABOUT 0835 SUDDENLY all OF CALL

Picture 4: *Visibility Condition of LADY AZIZA According to Log Records*

1.2 Course of Events Leading to Accident

1.2.1 Before the Accident

GÖKBEL loaded 3000 tons barite[2] from İskenderun port to Salerno and Ravenna ports of Italy and started to Salerno port on 13.12.2014. It unloaded half of the cargo at Salerno port and left for Ravenna port to unload the remaining 1500 tons. The master declared Notice of Readiness on 27.12.2014 at 09:20 that the ship was ready to berth and unload its cargo and then dropped anchor to the anchoring area (44° 30′07.54″ N - 012° 25′ 45.10″ E) of Ravenna port.

In GÖKBEL, watch change was made on 28.12.2014 for the watch of hours 04:00-08:00 at 04:00 between the crew and at 04:10 between second officer and chief officer. The Pilot Station called the ship at about 06:30 and announced that they would take the ship to the port at about 08:00. While preparations were continuing in GÖKBEL to heave up anchor, the second officer was also called to the bridge. When the second officer came to the bridge, the master and chief officer were at the bridge and the crew was making preparations at the forecastle to heave up anchor. The forecastle was not visible from the bridge from time to time as the weather was rainy mixed with snow and foggy.

Meanwhile, the second engineer who was on 04:00-08:00 watch, called the oiler B, at about 06:15 to the engine room to help in preparing the engine to the manoeuver. The oiler B went down to the engine room and conducted the routine checks upon the instruction of the second engineer and then paralleled the generators. The main engine started following the arrival of the chief engineer to the engine room at about 07:00.

On the other hand, LADY AZIZA started to prepare at 06:30 to leave Ravenna port. The harbor pilot who would guide the ship for the manoeuver of leaving Ravenna port and exit

[2] Barite mineral has a specific gravity which varies between 4,3-4,6 and %85-90 of the world's barite production is used in boring sector.

out of the breakwater boarded at 07:20 and then about one hour navigation in the channel was started.

During radio call between the Pilot Station and the master of GÖKBEL, the Pilot Station shared the information of another ship leaving the port and asked the master to heave up the anchor up to 2 shackles and wait for further notices from them. Thereupon, the master gave instructions to the crew waiting at the forecastle to get 5 of 8 shackles against the possibility of anchor dragging due to the storm effective in the region. The crew raised 5 shackles from the sea with no difficulty and started to wait with the 3rd shackle at the anchor windlass. While the notice of acceptance was awaited, the ship master sent the crew to the forecastle not to cause them to be influenced from the sprinkles of the sea due to the storm and sent the officers to the bridge to the dining hall to take their breakfast. He asked his breakfast to the bridge. The second officer went back to the bridge as soon as finished his breakfast and the chief officer followed within 5-6 minutes. The Pilot Station called the ship about half an hour after the last communication and asked them to heave up the anchor and proceed to the pilot embarkation station.

Heaving anchor, GÖKBEL started to navigate towards the pilot embarkation station at about 08:01. Meanwhile, while two of the crew heaving the anchor at the forecastle prepared to let both anchors go against the possibility of using these in the port manoeuvers, another seaman returned to stern of the ship to prepare the pilot ladder. When the crews at the forecastle were taking out the ropes for the preparation of berthing manoeuver, the chief officer ordered them to go back to accommodation. The crew returned to their accommodation from the portside due to the reason that the sprinkles formed by the waves arrived from the starboard.

Meanwhile, LADY AZIZA completed its navigation in the channel and the pilot disembarked at 08:10[3]. The pilot informed the master of LADY AZIZA before he disembarked that two ships were proceeding towards to pilot embarkation station. Following the disembarkation of the pilot, LADY AZIZA went out of the port breakwater at 08:24:12.

[3] Deck Log Book Records of the Ship



Figure 2: *Radar Image from VDR Records of LADY AZIZA*

Navigating towards to pilot embarkation station, the master of GÖKBEL was checking the heading of the ship just before the console which contains the navigation instruments at the portside of the bridge and, at the same time, follows the position of ship from the laptop computer in front of him. The chief officer monitors the movement of the other ships in the radar and the second officer was at steering. There was no additional person for watch at the bridge.

4 meter high waves formed by the storm are acting from starboard stern quarter of the ship in the region where 6 force wind as per Buford Wind Scale is effective. Poor visibility due to the reason that the region got rain mixed with snow and was foggy made the already difficult navigation more difficult.

1.2.2 The Accident

A pilot who provided guidance service to another ship which was departing the port called GÖKBEL at 08:23:20 from VHF which was proceeding with a speed of 4,7 miles at the course 286 towards to pilot embarkation station. The pilot told GÖKBEL that it fell (dragged) towards the South, there was two more ships were departing the port and asked the master to pass these ships red to red (port to port) and change his course more towards starboard. Thereupon, GÖKBEL changed its course 287 towards starboard and continued to proceed with courses varying between 293 and 297.

LADY AZIZA was noticed first by the crew of GÖKBEL at about 08:32 at the portside of forecastle line of the portside radar as a radar echo which darted in and out. This echo was considered by the chief officer as that it might belong to a pilot boat.



Figure 3: *Positions of Both Ships at 08.32 (VDR-AIS)*

The chief officer piloted the displayed echo from the radar, identified from the automatic identification system that the echo belongs to LADY AZIZA by making use of the echo's bearing, and again came to the portside radar to evaluate the condition of the crossing of his ship. As stated by the second officer, seeing that both ships was proceeding in a collision course, the chief officer informed the master about the critical condition and called LADY AZIZA through VHF-DSC wireless telephone device (VHF)[4] but couldn't get a response to his calls.

[4] There doesn't exist a record in the VHF voice records obtained from the port concerning the calls which are stated to be made. However, VHF talks with the ships navigating in the vicinity of the accident scene following the accident are not present too. In this case, it is assessed that the VHF channel on which GÖKBEL called LADY AZIZA and the channel used by the port authority to talk with the other ships is same and the talks over this channel are not recorded.

Pre-collision incidents were entered to bridge log book records of LADY AZIZA as “The chief officer at the forecastle at 08:35 noticed the master at the bridge that there was a ship at the fore and the ship master turned the rudder hard to starboard.”



Picture 5: *Deck Log Book Record of LADY AZIZA*

Upon observing on the radar that LADY AZIZA was coming on with a speed of 12 nautical miles at the collision course, the master of GÖKBEL gave starboard 10 rudder command to avoid the collision. When it started to take its course to starboard at 08:36:12, its course was 289. Meanwhile, the Pilot Station called GÖKBEL and asked its course and speed and GÖKBEL responded that its speed was 4,2 and course 297. Thereupon, the Pilot Station gave full ahead command to GÖKBEL and GÖKBEL approved. Ship master of GÖKBEL couldn’t obtain the wished turning effect in the ship with the rudder command and went to the helm and turned it hard to starboard and tried to warn the other ship with an audio sign with the horn[5]. But the course changes were not sufficient to avoid the collision and the ships collided at 08:37:58. At the moment of collision, GÖKBEL’s course was 326 and speed 3,9 nautical miles and LADY AZIZA course was 089 and speed 12,3 nautical miles.

[5] Statement of the personnel.



Figure 4: *Drawing of Ships' Collision*



Figure 5: *Drawing of Ships' Collision*

Figure 6[6]: *AIS Image Showing the Collision of Ships*

Picture 6: *AIS Image Showing the Collision of Ships*

[6] http://www.gemitrafik.com/GÖKBEL



Figure 7: *Courses and Speeds of the Ships at the Moment of Collision (VDR-AIS)*

At the collision location where visibility was very low due to fog, the lights of LADY AZIZA could only be seen by the personnel of bridge of GÖKBEL after the collision. Immediately after the collision, the master and chief officer stated from VHF Channel 11 (Ravenna port's Pilot Station communication channel) at 08:36:41 that a ship collided them and made help me call (MAYDAY) from VHF Channel 16 at 08:38:19[7]. Meanwhile, the second officer called for help over Inmarsat-C device. When the second officer went down to his cabin to get the document bag of the ship upon the directive of the master, he saw that the ship started to list towards portside. As soon as he got back to the bridge, the second officer put on one of the life jackets present at the bridge against the danger of sinking of the ship.

[7] There is a discrepancy between the time recorded at VHF channel 16 and the times recorded at VDR and VHF channel 11. +2 minutes are added to the time recorded at VHF Channel 16 in order to synchronize the hours.

In the meantime, the engine room personnel who met the request of full ahead from the bridge about 5 seconds before the collision fell down with the impact of collision. At the same moment, the power of the ship was interrupted and emergency lighting stepped in immediately afterwards. When oiler B stood up, the chief engineer directed him to check the generators. The chief engineer and the other engine room personnel observed that steam was coming out of the main engine and the chief engineer promptly stopped the auxiliary engines and the main engine. The engine room personnel thought that the ship collided the dock during berthing manoeuver but they went out from the engine room to understand what happened. While the personnel left the engine room, they didn't witness any incident of flooding.

The crew who were waiting the instruction of port berthing manoeuver at the mess room fell from the seats to the floor of the hall with a severe bump at the moment of collision. The shocked crew 1-2 minutes after the collision went out to portside door entrance to understand what happened. At that moment, the engine room personnel joined them. The personnel at the portside door entrance gangway saw that another ship had collided their ship from the aft corner of the portside hold number 2. According to the observation of a seaman, forecastle of the LADY AZIZA entered about 20-30 cm into GÖKBEL. After about 1 minute following the arrival of the personnel of GÖKBEL at the gangway, also the personnel of colliding LADY AZIZA came to the forecastle to check the damage to their ship. After checking the damage, the personnel of LADY AZIZA left the forecastle and then LADY AZIZA moved astern and was separated from GÖKBEL.

The crew going to the bridge rushed to their cabins upon hearing the loud call of a personnel coming down the bridge "we are sinking, take your life jackets", took their life jackets and immersion suits and went up to the bridge. Only one personnel first went to the muster point, then to the bridge when he saw no one there. The chief engineer was the last one to go up the bridge. When the chief engineer saw the other ship, the other ship was separated from GÖKBEL and there was approximately a distance of 100 meters between the ships. The ship master expressed the present situation to the chief engineer as "a ship collided, apparently we are sinking". In a shock, the chief engineer ran down to his cabin, collected his life jacket and again got back up to the bridge. All 11 personnel on board

gathered at the bridge, put on their life jackets and started to wait the instructions of the master. Meanwhile, VHF talks of the chief officer and the ship master continued. When the master instructed the crew to lower the life rafts to the sea in the scope of preparation of abandoning the ship, the first floor of the accommodation of the ship was flooded and the ship started to list portside. When the crew went to lower the life raft at the portside, a wave took that life raft away. When they went to the starboard to lower the starboard life raft, although they were able to unfasten the rope of the life raft, they couldn't lower the life raft to the sea due to the reason that the ship was listed to portside and they returned to the bridge.

Meanwhile, LADY AZIZA provided contact with the Pilot Station at 08:41:23 and gave information that they collided with another ship due to fog. Then, the following dialogues were realized between the Pilot Station and LADY AZIZA;

08:43:43	*LADY AZIZA*	*Yes, Another vessel needs to rescue, another vessel need to rescue*
08:43:58	*PILOT*	*Are you able to proceed back to the Pilot Station to pick up the Pilot?*
08:44:05	*LADY AZIZA*	*But during fog, I cannot proceed but other vessel…*

LADY AZIZA called the Pilot Station at 08:50:36 and 08:50:40, but couldn't get any response to its call.

08:51:18	*LADY AZIZA*	*Yes I ask you few rear other vessel rescue and safe them*
08:51:19	*PILOT*	*Yes captain also for you maintain the calm. All the services at you full speed at owner*
08:51:27	*LADY AZIZA*	*Ok ok but other vessel is sinking better them*
08:51:29	*PILOT*	*Of course captain we are approaching to them*
08:56:45	*LADY AZİZA*	*Ravenna Pilot, LADY AZIZA, is Tug going out for other vessel*
08:56:49	*PILOT*	*Yes four tug coming out at full speed*

GÖKBEL provided the last contact with the Pilot Station over VHF at 08:51:10 and with the Ravenna Maritime Authority at 08:53:23[8]. Calls from the Port Authority to GÖKBEL at 08:57:43[9] were not replied.

1.2.3 Abandon Ship

The master of GÖKBEL gave the instruction to the second officer to record 08:45 to the deck log book as the sinking time of the ship and gave the abandonment command 2-3 minutes after this instruction. The ship master wanted the second officer to get the deck log book and the bag which contained the passports and seaman books of the personnel. When the ship master ordered to abandon from starboard bridge wing the ship which was rapidly going down from the stern, the sea water had a distance of 2-3 meters to reach the starboard bridge wing. The personnel going on the starboard bridge wing altogether started to jump into the sea when the sea was 2 meters from the starboard bridge wing. Although the ship crew had the immersion suit with them when they went to the bridge, they abandoned the ship without putting them on either because of there was no time left or in the panic of that moment. A certain sequence was not followed in the abandonment and the last three personnel who abandoned the ship are the master, seaman and second officer, respectively. Last abandoning the ship, the second officer threw the ship's bag to the sea and jumped into the sea from the bridge wing when the distance to the sea was 1 meter.

The accident victims had difficulty to move in the water and maintain their consciousness due to the reason that the weather and sea water was cold. A great part of the accident victims who abandoned the ship gathered around a life buoy in a distance of approximately 50 meters to the sinking ship (Chief Engineer, Chief Officer, Seaman A, Oiler A, Second Engineer, Seaman B). Oiler B was just out of this circle, Seaman C and Cook near the unopened life raft, the second officer rather separate from the others. The master was last seen by Oiler B nearby the ship, but then disappeared.

[8],[9] There is a discrepancy between the time recorded at VHF channel 16 and the times recorded at VDR and VHF channel 11. +2 minutes are added to the time recorded at VHF Channel 16 in order to synchronize the hours.



Figure 8[10]: *Positions of the Accident Victims after the Accident Compared to the Ship*

The second officer who had seen the ship master 2 times in short time intervals after jumping into the sea tried to reach the gathered personnel but he couldn't go near them due to waves and wind. In his terms, he was backed by the waves and started to wait to be rescued.

Oiler B crossed the master that he was nearby the ship immediately after jumping into the sea. He saw seaman C and cook holding to the life raft in a little while. Oiler B tried to go near these personnel first, but later on he saw a great part of the personnel holding altogether to a life buoy in approximately 50 meters distance, he started to swim towards them while swimming towards the other personnel, he heard the help call of the chief engineer swayed with the waves and wind. He reached to the second engineer who stayed on his back on water and delivered him near the other personnel by holding from his clothes. It is stated in the interview made with the chief engineer that the life jackets of all the personnel gathered around the life buoy were ruptured. When oiler B and second engineer reached to the gathered ship crew, only the fore of ship was seen. Oiler B asked the chief officer the distance to the land and upon getting the reply that it was too far to

[10] Drawn According to Statements of The Accident Victims.

swim, he started to wait with them but stayed out of the circle. While the dense fog effective in the region continued, seeing that seaman C inflated the life raft about 100-150 meters ahead of them, the chief engineer asked seaman B to lead everyone to the life raft by holding the rope of the life buoy.

Indicating that he could reach the painter line of the inflatable life raft at approximately 1 hour after the ship sank, seaman C first tried to activate the inflating system by pulling the painter line of the life raft 3-4 times but he couldn't succeed. When he couldn't activate the inflating system of the life raft, he climbed on the life raft and attempted to activate the system of inflating the life raft towards the inside of water. His effort continued for about 1,5 hours, as he expressed, and at last he succeeded to inflate the life raft. While the seaman tried to activate the inflating system of the life raft, his life jacket got out in some time. When the life raft was inflated, the seaman and cook tried to go in, but they couldn't succeed.

Meanwhile, seeing that seaman C inflated the life raft, the gathered personnel shouted but they couldn't get any reply. Oiler B started to swim towards the inflated life raft and, although at some stage his foot was tangled to a thin life buoy, continued to swim by freeing his foot. Oiler B swam approximately 100-150 meters and reached the life raft and succeeded to get into it.

Then oiler B helped the cook who asked for help and succeeded to take him in the life raft with body and one foot in (%90). One foot of the cook was left outside due to the reason that his foot was tangled to the thin life buoy. Oiler B tried to free the foot of the head cook from the rope but he couldn't succeed. Then, he helped seaman C and take him to go on the life raft. Meanwhile, visibility increased to 150-200 meters. 3 persons going on the life raft were tired such much that they couldn't move on the life raft as they got exhausted because they were left in the cold water for a time period of about 2 hours and they continuously swallowed water and vomited in the sea.

1.2.4 Search and Rescue Operation

In order to rescue the crew of GÖKBEL, pilot boat Eba (Picture 7), mooring boat Terzo Sirotti (Picture 8) and the tugboats named Eduardo Primo(Picture 9), Eduardo Junior

(Picture 10), Francesco Paolo (Picture 11) departed from Ravenna port. The assigned 3 tugboats and 1 mooring boat departed from the port at about between 08:45-08:50 and exited from the breakwater at about 09:00. Since the pilot boat Eba participating in the search and rescue operation didn't have The Automatic Identification System (AIS) so its search and rescue operations could not be followed from the The Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) records of LADY AZIZA.

Picture 7: *EBA*

Picture 8: *TERZO SIROTTI*

Picture 9: *EDUARDO JUNIOR*

Picture 10: *FRANCESCO PAOLO*

Picture 11: *EDUARDO PRİMO*



Figure 9: *Tugboats and Mooring Boat Exiting Ravenna Breakwater (VDR-AIS)*

The following communications between the pilot boat Eba which first reached the accident scene and the Ravenna Maritime Authority[11].

Pilot Boat *09:01:23 I am at the pilot boat in the region, visibility maximum 10 meters.*

Pilot Boat *09:06:51 The ship sank except fore.*

Ravenna Maritime Authority *09:06:58 Can you rescue the crew?*

Pilot Boat *09:07:03 I can see no one.*

Pilot Boat *09:08:23 Final status: visibility 10 meters, waves 2 meters, stern of the ship under water.*

[11] Communication between pilot boat and Ravenna Maritime Authority via VHF channel 11

Picture 12: *Arrival of pilot Boat Eba at The Accident Scene*

Pilot boat Eba first found the second officer among the accident victims in the sea and rescued him. The second officer guessed the time of being in the sea as 25 minutes and recognized that this time was about 1,5 hours when he looked at his watch.

3 tugboats and 1 mooring boat which participated in the search and rescue operation arrived at the incident scene at about 09:20 and started the search and rescue by reducing their speeds.[12]



Figure 10: Tugboats *and Mooring Boat Arriving at the Incidence Scene (VDR-AIS)*

[12] VDR Records of LADY AZIZA

After rescuing the second officer from the sea, the pilot boat searched the other accident victims for about 30 minutes. When the pilot boat found 6 accident victims gathered in the sea, it threw life buoy to them. Seaman B caught the life buoy and they went near the pilot boat, one hand on the life buoy which the personnel collectively held and the other hand on the thrown life buoy. As expressed by the chief engineer, the condition of oiler A and second engineer was bad when the pilot boat reached them in 2 hours' time. Then the accident victims held on the ropes of the pilot boat at the portside. The personnel of the pilot boat first took seaman B, and then the chief engineer and oiler A to the pilot boat respectively. The personnel of the pilot boat first tried to take the accident victims on board who cooperated with them with their hands and feet. The chief engineer and seaman B went down together to the lower deck of the pilot boat and wrapped to an existing nylon cover. Then the chief engineer fainted. On the other hand, oiler A lost his life in the arms of the second officer before going to the coast. As stated by the master of the pilot boat, despite their efforts to take out the other accident victims from the sea afterwards, the personnel who didn't have life jackets sank into the sea during the rescue works and couldn't appear again. At 10:33:27, the pilot boat called Ravenna Maritime Authority and gave the information that they had taken from the sea 4 persons in bad conditions, the accident victims suffered hypothermia, they tried to back to port but they couldn't due to rough sea. In the meantime, the pilot boat also escaped from sinking. Then the personnel of the pilot boat tried to transfer the accident victims to the approaching Eduardo Primo and Francesco Paolo tugboats, but they couldn't succeed. The tugboats, then, towed the pilot boat and headed towards the port. When the tugboats entered from breakwater the time was 12:37.

Mooring boat Terzo Sirotti found seaman C, oiler B and cook about 10-15 minutes after they got on the life raft. The oiler who adjusted the timing between the mooring boat and life raft moving on the waves jumped to the mooring boat. The mooring boat tried to get seaman C for a time but was not successful.

Accident victim seaman C was rescued by the tugboat personnel and taken on the tugboat. As stated by seaman C, the tugboat personnel tried to rescue the head cook for 45 minutes

and left to go to the coast when the accident victim started to doze off. While search and rescue activities continued in the region, mooring boat Terzo Sirotti entered from the breakwater at 13:36 accompanied by Eduardo Junior tugboat which participated in the search and rescue activities.

In addition, Vos Hestia (Picture 13) and Ievoli Black (Picture 14), offshore supply vessels (Picture 15), participated in the search and rescue works at about 11:50, Wolf (Picture 15) personnel carrier, which left the breakwater at about 12:10, Francesco Paolo tugboat which left the breakwater at about 14:08, offshore supply vessel Puma Primo which left the breakwater at about 14:23.

Picture 13: *Offshore Supply Vessels VOST HESTIA*

Picture 14: *Offshore Supply Vessels IEVOLI BLACK*

Picture 15: *Personnel Carrier WOLF*

Picture 16: *Offshore Supply Vessels PUMA PRIMO*

From the ships participating in the search and rescue works, offshore supply vessel Vos Hestia terminated the search and rescue activities of the first day by entering from the breakwater at 16:03, personnel carrier Wolf at 16:28, Francesco Paolo tugboat at 17:38, Puma Primo at 19:17, offshore supply vessel Ievoli Black at about 22:00.

5 crew members of GÖKBEL who were saved alive from the accident (the second officer, Chief Engineer, Seaman B, Seaman C, Oiler B) and 1 crew member who lost his life on the pilot boat after saved alive (Oiler A) were taken to the hospital with the ambulances waiting at the port. The accident victims who were treated in time periods varying between 1 to 5 days were discharged from the hospital and sent to Turkey after their treatment was completed.

Picture 17: *The Accident Victims to Taken The Coast*

Picture 18: *The Accident Victims Taken to The Coast*

Picture 19: *The Accident Victims Taken to The Coast*

Picture 20: *The Accident Victims Taken to The Coast*

Of the personnel of GÖKBEL lost in the sea, the corpses of the master and able seaman A were found about 120 miles off the Ravenna port while the cook was found off Ancona port (160 miles south of Ravenna port). The corpse of the lost second engineer was found on May 24, 2015 at a coast nearby Ancona port. No information about the chief officer lost in the accident was obtained by the date of completion of the accident report.

1.3 DAMAGE

1.3.1 Damage to GÖKBEL and Environmental Pollution

While the deck and accommodation of GÖKBEL had material damage over the water level close the aft quarter of the portside hold number 2, it was damaged in the board at a section near to the engine room bulkhead under the water level at portside hold number 2.

Picture 21: *Wreck Removal of GÖKBEL*

Picture 22: *Taking GÖKBEL Out of the Sea*

The ship started flooding due to the damages and it sank due to loss of stability. None of the ship personnel was injured during the collision. However, after the abandonment, one of the ship personnel was lost and corpses of four were found in the sea. One of six accident victims who were rescued alive from the accident lost his life after being saved. After the collision, any environmental pollution originating from GÖKBEL was not reported.

1.3.2 Damage to LADY AZIZA and Pollution

Two very close breakdowns happened on the forecastle over waterline of LADY AZIZA. None of the personnel of the ship was injured in the collision. After the collision, any environmental pollution originating from LADY AZIZA was not reported.

Picture 23: *Damage on LADY AZIZA After Collision*

1.4 GÖKBEL

1.4.1 Safety Management Certificate (SMC) and Documentation of Compliance (DOC) of GÖKBEL

Safety Management Certificate was issued by Turkish Lloyd on 29.02.2012 at İstanbul / Turkey. Interim survey is scheduled for SMC certificate between second and third anniversaries.

A technical non-compliance was not encountered in the report of technical audit performed by DPA[13] at GÖKBEL on 20.11.2014.

1.4.2 Key Personnel of GÖKBEL

1.4.2.1 Master

Master was 42 years old and had a certificate of competency qualified him as master in the ships up to 3000 GRT (Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers II/2). He had been a master since 2009. He was the master of 5 different ships before GÖKBEL which varied between 3500-4500 DWT. He started at GÖKBEL as a master on 19.11.2014.

1.4.2.2 Chief Officer

First officer was 59 years old and had a certificate of competency qualified as first officer in the ships up to 3000 GRT (Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers II/2. He served in GÖKBEL as first officer in his last three contracts. He started at GÖKBEL as first officer on 09.09.2014.

1.4.2.3 The Second Officer

The second officer was 22 years old and had a certificate of competency qualified as second officer in the ships up to 3000 GRT (Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers II/2. The first ship which the second officer served is

[13] DPA :Designated Person Ashore

GÖKBEL after school probations and attended the ship 39 days before the accident (19.11.2014).

1.4.3 Watchkeeping Routine

Watchkeeping routine alters to watchkeeping arrangements in port following the anchoring of GÖKBEL. Anchor watches are kept with watch personnel just as the navigation watches against the possibility of stormy weather and anchor dragging of the ship.

Navigation watch;
24:00-04:00 and 12:00-16:00 Watchkeeping Officer + Seaman
04:00-08:00 and 16:00-20:00 Chief Officer + Seaman
20:00-24:00 and 08:00-12:00 Ship Master + Seaman

1.4.4 Instructions for Navigation Watch

In handbook of Safe Management System of Çetinkaya Denizcilik Transport ve Tic. Ltd. Şti., the instructions concerning "Bridge Navigation Watch Procedures" under sub title 7.1.1, "Navigation in Heavy Weather" under sub title 7.1.3 and "Navigation in Limited Visibility" under sub title 7.1.5 of part 7 with title Ship Organizations are determined.

Master instructions of GÖKBEL concerning the navigation watch are not accessible since the ship has sunk.

1.4.5 Charts, Radars, AIS Device and VDR

British Admiralty nautical charts are used in the ship and 1445 Ravenna port chart and 1467 Ravenna Port approach chart was available on board. There exist 2 X Band ARPA[14] radars at starboard and portside of the bridge. The personnel expressed that both radars were operated in North-Up position at the moment of accident. The chief officer was

[14] Automatic Radar Plotting Aid

operating the portside radar to avoid collisions and determine the existence of the surrounding ships.

The second officer put the location where the harbor pilot would embark and disembark the ship on the chart together with its Global Positioning System (GPS). Since GPS and radars are interconnected, the location where the harbor pilot would embark and disembark the ship may also be seen on the radar screen. The course followed in GÖKBEL which doesn't have Electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) is further followed by the ship master on the lap top computer used at the bridge and to which the chart program is downloaded besides the navigation charts used in the ship.

There exists AIS device on the ship and it was tested on 07.08.2014 and documented to be in good condition.

Bridge conversation, main engine commands, radar information and the information from the other related devices on the ship are recorded in Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) according to International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) part V which amended by A.861(20) of IMO enforced on July 1, 2002. According to the A.861 (20), the cruise ships and ships other than the cruise ships over 3000 tons and more which are built on July 1, 2002 and later shall carry VDR. GÖKBEL was not required to carry VDR because it was 2126 GT.

1.4.6 Life Saving Equipment and Their Arrangement On Board

19 Immersion suit, 19 life jackets and 2 child life jackets available on GÖKBEL. The personal life saving equipment was checked by the authorized firm on 08.08.2014 and a certificate was issued upon determining that they were in good condition.

The life rafts on board are produced in May 2008. The life rafts were examined / tested by the authorized maintenance firm on 08.08.2014 and a document of compliance was issued.

According to International Safety Management Code(ISM) documents, it is understood that the personal life saving equipment and the life rafts and rigging of the life rafts on board were checked in monthly periods by the chief officer. Personal life saving equipment

and the life rafts and rigging of the life rafts were checked last on 04.11.2014 and they were determined to be in good condition and this was entered to ISM documents.

Rescue boat davit was tested on 21.11.2014 and it was determined suitable for use as the result of the performed test and a certificate was issued. The materials within was checked on 12.11.2014 and the engine and lowering mechanisms were checked on 24.11.2014 and entered to ISM documents. The location of the Rescue Boat, Life Rafts and Personal Life Saving Equipment on board of GÖKBEL are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.



Figure 11: *Location of Rescue Boat and Life Rafts on GÖKBEL*



Figure 12: *Location of Personal Life Saving Equipment on GÖKBEL*

1.4.7 Drills:

It is understood from ISM records that drills were conducted as planned within 2014 calendar year. According to ISM records, two "Abandonment" drills were conducted within two months previous to the sinking of the ship. First muster drill was conducted on 19.11.2014 at 10:00-11:30 upon the replacement of %90 of the ship's crew (ANNEX-7). In the drill, the personnel was gathered in the personnel hall, their muster cards are checked, place of the life rafts was pointed, the rescue boat was operated by lowering to the sea and taking back to its place.

The second "Abandonment" muster drill was realized with the participation of all personnel on 21.11.2014 at 13:10-13:45 as planned in 2014 calendar year. In the drill, the personnel gathered in the muster point upon the given alarm, the materials and muster cards which the personnel shall bring along during the abandonment, the rescue boat was operated by lowering to the sea and taking back to its place (ANNEX-8).

1.5 LADY AZIZA

Master, chief officer and second officer of LADY AZIZA are of Syrian nationality. In the ship berthed at Ravenna port after the accident for investigation, all personnel except the master left the ship. The request for performing an investigation in LADY AZIZA berthed in a private dock in Ravenna port of Italy and interviewing the ship master was forwarded to Ravenna Maritime Authority. The authorities forwarded this request to the attorney of the ship, but this request wasn't accepted. Due to these reasons, the information related to LADY AZIZA ship has become limited to the primary information obtained after the accident by the Italian Accident Investigation Unit.

Picture 24: *LADY AZIZA Berthed in A Private Dock in Ravenna Port*

1.5.1 Safety Management Certificate (SMC) and Documentation of Compliance (DOC)

Interim Safety Management Certificate (ISMC) of the ship was issued on 18.10.2014 by Dromon Bureau of Shipping in Rotterdam / Netherlands. As the result of the audit conducted in the ship on 17.10.2014 by Dromon Bureau of Shipping; it was determined

that the crew didn't have labor contracts suitable to International Safe Management Code (ISM) and 3 months' time was given to close the non-compliance.

1.5.2 Navigation Watch Routine

It is seen from the records of the seaman rest hours that the watch order of the personnel of LADY AZIZA varied according to if the ship master keeps navigation watch. The watch order established after 11th of December was as follows.

December 11 – December 18
24:00-06:00 and 12:00-18:00 Chief Officer
06:00-12:00 and 18:00-24:00 Second officer

December19 – December 23
24:00-04:00 and 12:00-16:00 Second officer
04:00-08:00 and 16:00-20:00 Chief Officer
08:00-12:00 and 20:00-24:00 Master

December 24
24:00-06:00 and 12:00-18:00 Second officer
06:00-12:00 and 18:00-24:00 Chief Officer

December 25
24:00-10:00 Second officer
06:00-12:00 Chief Officer

December 26-27
07:00-16:00 Second officer
07:00-16:00 Chief Officer
08:00-17:00 Master

December 28
07:00-16:00 Second officer

1.5.3 Navigation Charts, Radars, AIS Device and VDR

Paper nautical charts ((British Admiralty (BA) Nautical Charts)) are used in the ship. It is understood from the photos taken in the ship after the accident that chart no BA 204 (Sedmovrace to Trieste and Ravenna to Venezia) was used in the ship.

Picture 25: *BA 204 Navigation Chart Used in LADY AZIZA*

There were 2 radars at starboard and portside of the central axis of the bridge of LADY AZIZA. These radars are X band and S band, respectively, and both didn't have ARPA feature (feature of plotting a selected target / following the target).

Picture 26: *View from the Bridge of LADY AZIZA*

According to VDR records of LADY AZIZA, one of the radars is operated in course above position. Again according to VDR records, GÖKBEL started to appear on the radar screen of LADY AZIZA from 08:32:41. In this meantime, there was 1,44 miles distance between GÖKBEL and LADY AZIZA. Starting from this point, it is understood that the range of one of the radars of LADY AZIZA was adjusted to 1.5 miles.



Figure 13: *Radar View of LADY AZİZA (VDR-AIS)*

There was AIS device on the ship and it was tested on 07.08.2014 and documented to be in good condition.

3828 GT LADY AZIZA had VDR in accordance to A.861(20) of IMO which is enforced on July 1, 2002. After the accident, VDR records of LADY AZIZA were taken and the photos of VDR units were taken. It is seen in the photos that VDR device of LADY AZIZA gave error warning and VDR battery expiry date passed. But it was observed from VDR records taken from the ship that VDR records were healthily kept before and after the accident.

Picture 27: *VDR Panel of LADY AZIZA*

Picture 28: *VDR Battery of LADY AZIZA*

PART 2 – ANALYSIS

2.1 Actions of GÖKBEL Before Collision

Anchored at approximately 5.7 miles to the east of Ravenna breakwater, GÖKBEL raised its anchor and started at 08:01 to the location where the pilot would embark. It changed its course at 08:25 from 285 to 295 by observing the advice of the pilot at 08:22:20 who guided another ship exiting the port and continued to proceed towards the port entrance until 08:36:06 in the course range of 292 to 300. When it started maneuvering at 08:36:12 to avoid collision with LADY AZIZA, course of GÖKBEL was 289 and speed 4,1 nautical miles. Its course was 310 and speed 4,4 nautical miles at 08:37:41 when it warned LADY AZIZA with the ship's horn and its course was 326 and speed 3,9 nautical miles at 08:37:58 when it collided with LADY AZIZA.



Figure 14: *Course Followed by GÖKBEL*

When the course followed by GÖKBEL starting from heaving up anchor to the moment of colliding with LADY AZIZA is examined, two changes are seen in its course. First one is taking its course to 10 degrees starboard by observing the advice of the pilot who guided another ship exiting the port and the second is taking its course to 37 degrees starboard in the scope of the manoeuver of avoiding collision with LADY AZIZA. But when GÖKBEL started the manoeuver of avoiding collision, there was distance of 0,56 nautical miles

between the ships. This distance has not become sufficient for GÖKBEL to conduct the manoeuver of avoiding collision. As a matter of fact, the collision has occurred in 1 minute 46 seconds following the start of manoeuver of avoiding collision.



Figure 15: *Position of Each Ship Opposite to the Other at 08:36:12 (VDR-AIS)*

2.1.1 Assessment of Collision Danger

Prior to the collision, while the ship master of GÖKBEL checks the fore of the ship, at the same time he follows the position of the ship from the lap top computer in front of him. The chief officer follows on the portside radar the movements of the ships in the surroundings and the second officer was at the helm. There is not a further watchkeeper on the bridge. LADY AZIZA was first determined at about 08:32 on the portside radar and piloted on the radar and it is learned from AIS device that the echo belongs to LADY AZIZA.

Existence of the collision danger is noticed by the chief officer to the ship master and, at the same time, an announcement is made to LADY AZIZA over VHF. Not getting a response from LADY AZIZA, GÖKBEL starts to get its course to starboard at 08:36:12. Ship master couldn't obtain the wished turning effect in the ship with the rudder command and went to the rudder and turned it hard to starboard and tried to warn the other ship with the ship's horn.

The expressions *''(b). Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects.''* are included in International Regulation for Preventing Collision in Sea (COLREGS) under section I (Conduct of vessel in any condition of visibility) regulation 7. Risk of collision, expressions *''(a). Any action to avoid collision shall be taken in accordance with the Rules of this Part and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the observance of good seamanship.''* under regulation 8. Action to avoid collision, expressions *"(d). A vessel which detects by radar alone the presence of another vessel shall determine if a close-quarters situation is developing and/or risk of collision exists. If so, she shall take avoiding action in ample time,....."* undersection III (Conduct of vessels in restricted visibility) regulation 19. Conduct of vessel in restricted visibility,

When GÖKBEL recognized LADY AZIZA at 08:32, 6 minutes before collision, there exists a distance of 1,62 miles between the ships. Examining the course and speed of the ship 15 minutes before collision (Table 1), it is seen that the manoeuver of avoiding collision is started at 08:36:12.

TABLE 1: COURSES, SPEEDS OF BOTH SHIPS AND THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THEM 15 MINUTES BEFORE THE COLLISION[15]

HOUR	LADY AZIZA		GÖKBEL		DISTANCE BETWEEN SHIPS
	COURSE	SPEED	COURSE	SPEED	
08:25:32	090	9,0	292	4,2	3,21
08:25:36	091	9,7	292	4,2	3,2
08:25:50	088	9,5	294	4,3	3,15
08:25:55	087	9,5	294	4,3	3,13
08:25:58	085	9,3	293	4,2	3,11
08:26:06	083	9,6	293	4,2	3,09
08:26:10	082	9,4	292	4,2	3,07
08:26:12	081	9,5	292	4,2	3,06
08:26:16	080	9,5	292	4,2	3,05
08:26:24	079	9,8	291	4,4	3,02
08:26:28	080	9,8	291	4,3	3,00
08:26:36	081	9,9	291	4,3	2,97
08:26:45	082	9,6	294	4,2	2,94
08:26:48	083	10,6	295	4,6	2,92
08:26:56	084	10,8	295	4,6	2,89
08:27:04	083	10,7	294	4,2	2,86
08:27:07	084	11,0	293	4,4	2,84
08:27:10	083	11,0	293	4,4	2,83
08:27:12	082	10,9	293	4,4	2,82
08:27:16	081	10,7	293	4,4	2,81
08:27:20	080	10,5	292	4,2	2,79
08:27:24	079	10,7	292	4,2	2,78
08:27:27	080	10,7	292	4,2	2,77
08:27:28	079	10,8	293	4,2	2,75
08:27:36	080	10,7	293	4,2	2,73
08:27:43	082	10,8	295	4,2	2,70
08:27:47	083	10,8	296	4,2	2,67
08:27:49	085	10,6	296	4,2	2,67
08:27:53	087	10,7	296	4,2	266
08:27:55	089	10,7	296	4,2	2,65
08:27:58	090	10,4	296	4,2	2,64
08:28:02	093	10,9	294	4,1	2,62

[15] Made According to VDR Records of LADY AZIZA.

HOUR	LADY AZIZA		GÖKBEL		DISTANCE BETWEEN SHIPS
	COURSE	SPEED	COURSE	SPEED	
08:28:03	095	10,7	294	4,1	2,62
08:28:09	098	11,2	293	4,1	2,59
08:28:13	100	10,7	293	4,1	2,58
08:28:22	099	9,4	294	4,0	2,54
08:28:26	097	11,7	294	4,0	2,53
08:28:28	096	10,0	294	4,0	2,52
08:28:30	095	10,9	297	4,3	2,51
08:28:34	092	10,2	297	4,3	2,49
08:28:40	089	9,9	298	3,8	2,47
08:28:44	088	10,5	298	3,8	2,45
08:28:50	087	10,2	297	4,1	2,43
08:29:00	088	10,6	296	3,9	2,38
08:29:10	089	10,7	296	4,0	2,35
08:29:19	090	10,8	297	3,9	2,31
08:29:39	091	10,7	298	3,8	2,23
08:29:41	090	11,1	298	3,8	2,22
08:29:45	091	11,4	298	3,8	2,21
08:29:58	092	11,2	297	3,8	2,16
08:30:00	091	11,2	297	3,8	2,15
08:30:02	092	11,2	297	3,8	2,13
08:30:06	093	11,7	297	3,8	2,13
08:30:15	094	11,6	297	3,8	2,09
08:30:27	093	11,1	299	3,8	2,04
08:30:37	091	12,1	298	3,8	2,00
08:30:43	090	11,6	2,97	3,8	1,97
08:30:45	089	11,9	2,97	3,8	1,96
08:30:47	088	11,9	297	3,8	1,96
08:30:49	087	11,6	297	3,8	1,94
08:30:53	085	11,4	297	3,8	1,92
08:30:57	084	11,9	297	3,8	1,91
08:31:03	082	11,9	298	4	1,88
08:31:05	081	11,8	298	4	187
08:31:19	082	11,9	297	4	1,81
08:31:20	083	11,4	297	4	1,80
08:31:28	085	12,4	297	4	1,77
08:31:30	086	11,7	297	3,9	1,76
08:31:43	085	11,8	296	4	1,70
08:31:49	084	12,7	297	3,9	1,68
08:31:53	083	11,8	297	3,9	1,66

HOUR	LADY AZIZA		GÖKBEL		DISTANCE BETWEEN SHIPS
	COURSE	SPEED	COURSE	SPEED	
08:31:59	081	12,4	298	4	1,63
08:32:01	080	12,2	298	4	1,62
08:32:03	079	12,2	298	4	1,62
08:32:05	078	12,0	298	4	1,61
08:32:07	077	12,0	298	4	1,59
08:32:09	075	12,1	298	4	1,59
08:32:11	074	11,9	298	4	1,58
08:32:13	072	12,0	298	4	1,57
08:32:17	070	11,7	298	4	1,56
08:32:27	065	11,3	297	4	1,52
08:32:29	063	11,4	296	4	1,50
08:32:31	062	11,7	296	4	1,49
08:32:32	061	11,7	296	4	1,49
08:32:37	060	11,1	296	4	1,48
08:32:39	058	11,1	296	4,2	1,46
08:32:45	057	10,9	296	4,2	1,44
08:32:49	056	11,2	297	4,1	1,42
08:32:59	057	11,3	297	4,0	1,38
08:33:02	058	11,0	297	4	1,37
08:33:27	057	11,5	296	4,1	1,27
08:33:33	058	11,4	295	4,1	1,25
08:33:39	059	11,6	297	4,0	1,22
08:33:41	060	11,6	297	4	1,21
08:33:45	061	11,6	297	4	1,21
08:33:51	064	11,7	298	4,2	1,18
08:33:55	065	11,8	298	4,2	1,17
08:33:57	066	11,6	298	4,2	1,16
08:33:59	068	11,6	299	4,2	1,14
08:34:03	070	11,7	299	4,2	1,13
08:34:05	071	11,8	299	4,2	1,13
08:34:11	073	11,9	299	4,2	1,10
08:34:12	074	12,1	299	4,1	1,09
08:34:14	075	12,3	299	4,1	1,08
08:34:19	076	11,4	300	4,1	1,06
08:34:21	077	12,4	300	4,1	1,05
08:34:25	078	11,6	300	4,1	1,04
08:34:26	079	11,8	300	4,1	1,03
08:34:28	080	11,8	298	4,0	1,02
08:34:33	081	11,6	298	4,0	1,01

HOUR	LADY AZIZA		GÖKBEL		DISTANCE BETWEEN SHIPS
	COURSE	SPEED	COURSE	SPEED	
08:34:36	082	12,2	298	4,0	1,00
08:34:40	084	12,1	295	4,0	0,98
08:34:44	085	12,1	295	4,0	0,96
08:34:48	086	12,1	296	4,0	0,93
08:34:54	087	12,3	296	4,0	0,92
08:35:05	088	12,9	297	4,1	0,86
08:35:22	087	12,6	297	3,9	0,78
08:35:35	088	12,7	297	4,1	0,73
08:35:36	087	12,0	297	4,1	0,73
08:35:43	088	12,7	296	4,1	0,69
08:35:46	087	12,4	296	4,1	0,69
08:35:55	088	11,9	295	4,1	0,64
08:36:02	087	12,7	292	4,1	0,60
08:36:04	088	12,7	292	4,1	0,60
08:36:06	087	12,6	292	4,1	0,59
08:36:12	088	12,4	289	4,1	0,56
08:36:16	087	12,5	289	4,1	0,55
08:36:19	087	12,4	291	4,2	0,52
08:36:29	088	13,2	294	4,0	0,48
08:36:40	088	12,2	297	4,4	0,42
08:36:50	088	12,1	299	4,0	0,38
08:37:19	088	12,4	301	4,1	0,25
08:37:28	088	12,5	304	4,1	0,20
08:37:39	088	12,2	310	4,4	0,16
08:37:41	088	13,1	310 Horn	4,4	0,15
08:37:46	088	12,6	314 Second Horn	4,3	0,12
08:37:49	088	13,3	318	3,9	0,10
08:37:52	088	12,0	321	4,4	0,09
08:37:56	088	12,7	325	3,8	0,08
08:37:58	089	12,4	326 collision	3,9	0,07
08:38:01	087	12,0	320	4,2	0,05

Since GÖKBEL couldn't use its both radars sufficiently and functionally to provide the navigation safety as specified in COLREGS/Rule 7 and Rule 19, it was not able to recognize LADY AZIZA in a sufficient time before collision. When it determined LADY AZIZA definitely and realized the manoeuver of avoiding collision, this manoeuver was not sufficient to avoid collision since it was not made in a sufficient time as specified in COLREGS/Rule 8. This condition shows that GÖKBEL didn't behave fully according to the rules stated in COLREGS/Rule 7, Rule 8 and Rule 19.

2.2 Actions of LADY AZIZA Prior to Collision

Completing the discharge of its load in Ravenna port, LADY AZIZA started departure manoeuver upon the boarding of the pilot at 07:20 and disembarked the pilot at 08:10 before exiting the breakwater. The pilot informed the master of LADY AZIZA before he embarked that two ships were progressing towards the location where the pilot would embark/disembark the ship. Speed of LADY AZIZA was 8,0 nautical miles and course 090 at 08:24:13 while exiting the breakwater. It continued on courses varying in a range off 079-090 until 08:28 after exiting the port. Its course was 100 at 08:28:13, 089 at 08:28:40 and 080 at 08:32:01. Taking its course rapidly to portside after 08:32:01, the navigation course of the ship was 056 at 08:32:39. Starting to alter its course again to starboard, LADY AZIZA reached to course 080 at 08:34:28 and 088 at 08:35:05. The course of LADY AZIZA which progressed in a range of 088-089 until collision time 08:37:58 was 089 just before the collision.



Figure 16: *Course Followed by LADY AZIZA*

In the examination of the course followed by LADY AZIZA after it left the breakwater, it is assessed that it couldn't recognize until the moment of collision the existence of GÖKBEL progressing in the collision course. When it recognized GÖKBEL, it was too late to make the collision avoiding manoeuver.

According to the deck logbook records of LADY AZIZA, it is stated that the chief officer positioned on the forecastle informed the bridge at 08:35 about a ship in front of them and the master turned the rudder hard to starboard to avoid collision. There is a distance of 0,91 miles between two ships which progress on the collision course at 08:35. It is clear that the collision can be avoided in case LADY AZIZA turns its rudder hard to starboard. However, there was no change in the speed and navigating course of LADY AZIZA from 08:35 to the moment of collision. This situation clearly puts forth that LADY AZIZA hasn't made hard-a-starboard to avoid collision as indicated in the logbook.



Figure 17: *Position of Each Ship Opposite to the Other at 08:35 (VDR-AIS)*

LADY AZIZA's course was 056 at 08:32:49 while it was 080 at 08:32:01. In this meantime, the echo of GÖKBEL started to be seen on 1,5 mile-adjusted radar screen of

LADY AZIZA after 08:32:42. LADY AZIZA returned again to course 080 at 08:34:28 and to course 087 at 08:34:54. LADY AZIZA made a 31 degrees change in its course towards starboard about 4 minutes before the collision. It is thought that LADY AZIZA performed such course change not to go out of the port's approach channel. It is obvious that such course change was made by not taking into consideration GÖKBEL which was progressing towards it in the port's approach channel.

This situation shows that electronic navigation aids (radar or AIS) were not used and an effective look out was not made as there were not a sufficient number of personnel on the bridge of LADY AZIZA.



Figure 18: *GÖKBEL's Image on Radar Screen of LADY AZIZA (VDR-AIS)*

On the other hand, it is clear that, changing the course to 24 degrees portside within a time of 3 minutes about 4 minutes before the collision, then changing it 31 degrees to starboard, shall mislead GÖKBEL which determines the existence of LADY AZIZA in the region and which may assess if it forms a danger of collision and attempts to perform the manoeuver required to avoid the collision.

2.2.1 Assessment of Collision Danger and Look-out

It is seen in the photos taken from the bridge of LADY AZIZA after the accident that it has two radars and both were in operating condition. The section related to sea meteorology was left empty in deck logbook records. However, it is observed from the photos taken at the incident scene after the accident that visibility is close to zero. Since an interview couldn't be made with the master of LADY AZIZA, the subject who was present on the bridge couldn't be clarified. In the interview made with the pilot who disembarked, he stated that he informed the ship master that GÖKBEL and MSC ELONARA were navigating towards the port entrance that the bridge devices were running and the ship master was left alone on the bridge when he was leaving the bridge. In addition, the sections about who were the watchman and person at the rudder at that moment were left empty in deck logbook records of LADY AZIZA. Again according to the logbook records, the existence of GÖKBEL and it formed a danger of collision was understood upon the notice to the bridge of chief officer present at the forecastle. On the other hand, when VDR records of LADY AZIZA were listened, not hearing anything else on the bridge before the collision except the sounds from VHF's supports that the master of LADY AZIZA was alone on the bridge.

Picture 29[16]: Visibility at the Collision Region

[16] www.ravennaedintorni.it

The expressions *''Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.''* are included in International Regulation for Preventing Collision in Sea (COLREGS) under section I (Conduct of vessel in any condition of visibility) regulation 5. Look-out, expressions *''(a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist. (b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects.....''* under regulation 7. Risk of collision, expressions*''(d). A vessel which detects by radar alone the presence of another vessel shall determine if a close-quarters situation is developing and/or risk of collision exists. If so, she shall take avoiding action in ample time ...''* under section III (Conduct of vessels in restricted visibility) regulation 19. Conduct of vessel in restricted visibility,

Although it isn't seen possible for LADY AZIZA to perform full look-out due to the reason that the visibility in the region was close to zero, it is assessed that the ship didn't fulfill the condition of sight and hearing look-out specified in COLREGS/Rule 5.

As specified in COLREGS/Rule 5, Rule 7 and Rule 19, LADY AZIZA should use both radars functionally to provide the navigation safety, and to make the necessary manoeuvers to avoid a probable collision condition by duly performing the observation of objects which echoes are seen on the radar screen. But, when the course followed by and speed of LADY AZIZA in the last 15 minutes (Table 1) are examined, it is understood that the ship couldn't detect the existence of GÖKBEL and that it formed a collision danger until the moment of collision. This situation shows that LADY AZIZA didn't fulfill the requirements of the rules specified in COLREGS/Rule 5, Rule 7 and Rule 19.

2.3 Sound and Attention Getting Signs Required by LADY AZIZA and GÖKBEL in Events of Limited Visibility.

The expressions *''In or near an area of restricted visibility, whether by day or night, the signals prescribed in this Rule shall be used as follows:*

(a). A power-driven vessel making way through the water shall sound at intervals of not more than 2 minutes one prolonged blast….'' are included under the title Sound signals to be used in restricted visibility of Rule 35 and *''If necessary to attract the attention of another vessel any vessel may make light or sound signals that cannot be mistaken for any signal authorized elsewhere in these Rules, or may direct the beam of her searchlight in the direction of the danger, in such a way as not to embarrass any vessel. ……''* under the title Signals to be used to attract attention of Rule 36, Part III- Conduct of vessels in restricted visibility of COLREGS.

When VDR records of LADY AZIZA are examined, it is seen that the collision was realized at 08:37:58. Two whistles are heard at 08:37:41 and 08:37:46 just before the collision of the ships. These whistles are given by GÖKBEL prior to the collision. In this respect, it is understood that both ships didn't give the whistle which is expressed in Rule 35 and which they should give under limited visibility conditions.

The sound signals expressed in Rule 36 under the title Attention Getting Signals was given by GÖKBEL just before the collision. But it wasn't given in a time to provide LADY AZIZA perceive the sound signal, assess the presence of danger of collision and be able to make the manoeuver required to avoid collision.

On the other hand, it is seen that the pilot who guided LADY AZIZA didn't warn LADY AZIZA about the sound signal to be given in limited visibility.

2.4 Use of AIS in GÖKBEL and LADY AZIZA

Automatic Identification System (AIS) is developed by using the developments in telecommunication technology in order to increase navigation safety and prevent sea accidents. Use of AIS device is made compulsory from December 31, 2004 in all internationally trading 300 GT or over ships.

By means of AIS, the ships may determine the dimensions, identities, locations, and most important, the course and speeds of the surrounding ships in any visibility and weather condition. By this means, by facilitating the ships to assess very early the presence of the danger of collision of ships, AIS contributes very much to the navigation safety of ships.

There exists AIS device both in LADY AZIZA and GÖKBEL. As stated by the second officer of GÖKBEL, AIS device was used to learn the identity of LADY AZIZA which was detected on the radar. Although there wasn't any information about the use of AIS by LADY AZIZA, it may be assessed that it didn't use AIS device as it couldn't detect GÖKBEL until the moment of collision.

''(*a).Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists''* is expressed in COLREGS/Rule 7. While, of the colliding ships, LADY AZIZA didn't use AIS device at all which is one of the best tools to detect the presence of danger of collision in limited visibility conditions, GÖKBEL used it very limited. In this respect, both ships didn't exhibit behaviors suitable to COLREGS/Rule 7.

2.5 Speed of GÖKBEL and LADY AZIZA

Sea current off Ravenna port is bi-directional, from north to south and from south to north. While, in general, the speed of current reaches 3 miles from north to south, the current is weak from south to north. In majority, fog may form in winter months, between September-March.[17] In addition, in the discussion between the Ravenna Maritime

[17] http://www.poseidonshipping.it/ports-s-info-16-ravenna.html

Authority personnel, it was expressed that a 3 miles current was present from north to south in the accident date.

The expression ‘‘*Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions.*’’ is included under the title Safe Speed in Rule 6 of COLREGS. Again in the same rule, the factors which shall be considered by the ships when determining the safe speed is specified and the factors:

(a). By all vessels:

(i). the state of visibility;

(iii). the maneuverability of the vessel with special reference to stopping distance and turning ability in the prevailing conditions;

(v). the state of wind, sea and current, and the proximity of navigational hazards;

(b). Additionally, by vessels with operational radar:

(iii). the effect on radar detection of the sea state, weather and other sources of interference;

are those which are related with the accident.

Again, the expression‘‘(*e). If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation, a vessel shall slacken her speed or take all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion. ...*’’is included under the title Action to Avoid Collision in Rule 8 of COLREGS.

While LADY AZIZA exited the breakwater, its speed was 8,0 nautical miles. LADY AZIZA started to increase its speed after it exited the breakwater and its speed was 12,4 nautical miles at the moment of collision. LADY AZIZA didn’t recognize GÖKBEL until the moment of collision also didn’t decrease its speed. On the other hand, while LADY

AZIZA should determine its navigation speed according to the visibility and weather conditions in the region where the visibility conditions were very low, its progress in normal navigation speed shows that it ignored the matters expressed in Rule 6 and Rule 8.

GÖKBEL reached a speed of 4 nautical miles after heaving up its anchor and progressed in an average speed of 4 nautical miles until the moment of accident to the location where the pilot would embark on board. It had a speed of 3,9 nautical miles at the moment of collision. When the speed of GÖKBEL was examined until the moment of collision, it is seen that it didn't change its speed to avoid the collision.

When the way gone after heaving up its anchor and progressed in an average speed of 4 nautical miles towards the port entrance by GÖKBEL until the moment of collision is entered on the chart, it is seen that the ship deviated towards south. This situation shows GÖKBEL determined its speed by considering the majority of factors to be considered which are specified in the definition of Safe Speed in COLREGS/Rule 6 but the effect of the direction and speed of current in the region, included in the above factors, on the ship couldn't be assessed very well.

2.6 Abandonment of GÖKBEL'S Personnel

A short time after the collision of GÖKBEL, the crew in the personnel hall and all the engine room personnel except the chief engineer took their life jackets and immersion suits and went to the bridge. Only one of the ship's personnel first went to the muster station point, but not seeing anyone there, he also went to the bridge. Being the last one who went to the bridge, the chief engineer was aware of the seriousness of the situation and, taking his life jacket from his cabin, he again went to the bridge. All 11 personnel on board were gathered on the bridge and put on their life jackets. Although all the ship personnel brought with them the immersion suits, they didn't put these on either because there was no sufficient time or in the panic of that moment. The personnel assigned by the master to lower the life rafts couldn't do this at the portside because the waves took away the portside life raft and couldn't lower the starboard life raft as the ship listed to portside and they returned to the bridge.

The master ordered to abandon from starboard bridge wing and all the personnel went to the starboard bridge wing. The ship personnel jumped into the sea with their life jackets when the sea had a distance of 2-3 meters to reach the starboard bridge wing 6 of the personnel who abandoned the ship were gathered and the others started to wait for rescuing around the ship in a scattered way.

When the Drills related with the abandonment are examined in the ISM records kept at the company, it is found that two "Abandonment" muster drill were conducted within two months before the sinking of the ship. The first muster drill was realized on 19.11.2014 upon the %90 replacement of the ship's personnel and the second muster drill on 21/11/2014 within 2014 Annual Plan of Drills.

It is found from the records of drills that the matters concerning abandonment were regularly fulfilled and no failure was experienced. But, the failures experienced within the time period passed from the decision of abandonment to rescuing the personnel after abandonment shows that the abandonment operation couldn't be realized as specified in the drills. The detected failures are as follows:

1. *A general alarm was not given following the moment of collision.*
2. *The ship's personnel gathered on the bridge instead of the previously determined muster station point.*
3. *Any one of the personnel who abandoned the ship didn't wear his immersion suit*
4. *The personnel who abandoned the ship didn't take along the devices and equipment such as EPIRB, GMDSS hand held radios and SART which should be taken along during abandonment, but their personal properties.*
5. *They couldn't succeed to abandon the ship with a lifesaving means (rescue boat and life raft).*
6. *The personnel got apart in the sea after they abandoned the ship and they couldn't succeed to stay together.*
7. *The personnel couldn't take on their life jackets regularly. (The personnel stated that their life jackets were torn out on them.)*

In the framework of the matters detected above, it is found that the training given in the ship concerning survival in the sea were not successful and the drills were not made sufficiently effective and didn't achieve their objective.

Another important matter which attracts attention on the subject of abandonment is that the depth of sea where the ship sank was 11,9 meters. When the ship flooded and started to sink, its stern sank, but its forecastle was left on water for a long time and then the ship sank completely. The accident victim personnel couldn't abandon the ship with a rescue boat or life raft because of quick sinking of the ship and weather conditions. When the ship started to flood and an important portion of the superstructure was flooded, the personnel tried to survive by jumping into the sea. In this case, it is assessed that the accident victims who had no chance to abandon the ship in dry conditions with their personal life saving equipment might increase their chance of surviving by not abandoning the ship until the last moment by considering the temperature of the sea water and depth of sea.

Picture 30: *GÖKBEL*

2.7 Help of LADY AZIZA to the Personnel of GÖKBEL

LADY AZIZA and GÖKBEL collided (44° 29′ 54.18″ N - 012° 22′ 20.57″ E) 2.5 nautical miles to the east of the breakwater. LADY AZIZA provided contact at 08:41:23 with Ravenna Pilot Station and stated that they had collided with another ship due to fog and the other ship needed help. Not being able to understand the seriousness of the

circumstance in the first stage, the person in charge at the Pilot Station asked LADY AZIZA if they could return and take on board a pilot and drop anchor at the location where the pilot would embark/disembark the ship. In reply, LADY AZIZA notified that it wouldn't proceed and asked the rescue and secure of the other ship. LADY AZIZA clearly stated to the Pilot Station at 08:51:27 that GÖKBEL had sunk and asked for giving precedence to GÖKBEL. Pilot Station informed LADY AZIZA that a pilot boat and 4 tugboats were proceeding towards GÖKBEL at full speed.

GÖKBEL was lost from AIS screen of LADY AZIZA at 09:02:28 after the collision when there was a distance of 0,54 miles between the ships.



Figure 19: *Collision Location of Ships*

After the collision, LADY AZIZA separated astern from GÖKBEL. The distance between two ships increased to 1 cable about 7 minutes after the collision. LADY AZIZA waited about 1,5-2 miles away from the collision location until it entered the port, directed to the port at about 16:20, entered the breakwater at 15:49 and berthed at the dock at 17:20.



Figure 20: *LADY AZIZA's Course Following The Collision*

The expression '*1 The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possible informing them or the search and rescue service that the ship is doing so……*'' is included under the sub title number one of title Danger Messages: Liabilities and Procedures in Rule 33, Part V of SOLAS.

Following the collision of two ships, GÖKBEL rapidly lost its buoyancy due to the damage while two small ruptures were formed above the water level of LADY AZIZA which wouldn't influence its buoyancy. The personnel of LADY AZIZA checked the forecastle of the ship after the collision and immediately after this, the ship separated from GÖKBEL. GÖKBEL'S personnel abandoned the ship about 15 minutes after the collision. GÖKBEL was lost in AIS screen of LADY AZIZA 24 minutes after the collision when there was a distance of 0,54 miles between two ships.

Although LADY AZIZA grasped the urgency of the condition in the VHF conversations between LADY AZIZA and the Pilot Station following the collision, it didn't make any attempt to save the lives of the personnel who abandoned their ship which was going to sink. In the examinations made on all VHF conversations between the pilot and LADY AZIZA, it is found that the Pilot Station couldn't understand the urgency of the condition

at the beginning. As a matter of fact, the Pilot Station didn't request LADY AZIZA to help GÖKBEL'S crew.

The reason why LADY AZIZA didn't help may be assessed as the request of the Pilot Station to return to the location where the pilot would embark and drop anchor by taking pilot, informing LADY AZIZA that all what was required to help GÖKBEL was made by the port, and heavy weather and low visibility conditions.

But it is assessed that, if LADY AZIZA had started the rescue works for the accident victim personnel in accordance with the related items of SOLAS convention, a great part or all of the personnel could be saved. Due to the reason that LADY AZIZA didn't start search and rescue activities, the search and rescue teams in the port arrived at the incident scene in about 23 minutes and might be able to save the first accident victim from the sea approximately one and half hours after the moment of accident. One of the accident victims who were saved alive by the search and rescue teams lost his life due to hypothermia on the pilot boat which rescued him. The other 5 rescued accident victims were treated in the hospital between 1 to 5 days due to health problems originating from hypothermia.

As known, hypothermia starts to form as a result of normal body temperature dropping from 37°C to 35°C as a result of exposure to cold for a long time. The temperature of sea water was +9°C while air temperature was +1,3 degrees. In this water temperature, the human body produces heat by trembling and tries to keep the body temperature in normal level. But when heat protection couldn't be provided, temperature drops under 35 degrees and the accident victim incurs hypothermia. When the body temperature drops under 30 degrees, death occurs after some time depending on the resistance of the bodies of accident victims.

Although there were too much variables, survival durations of an accident victim who doesn't have heat protection are given in (Table 2) for different water temperatures.

Table 2[18]: Unprotected Resistance Durations Within Water

Water Temperature (°c)	*(°c) When loss of consciousness Shall Occur*	*When Death Shall Occur*
0	*15 Minutes*	
10	*15-45 Minutes*	*Maximum 1,5 Hours*
15	*30-60 Minutes*	*Maximum 3 Hours*
20	*2-4 Hours*	*Maximum 6 Hours*
25	*3-7 Hours*	*Maximum 12 Hours*

The above table shows how much is time important for the survival of accident victims in the search and rescue operations especially in low sea water temperature. Considering that the pilot boat which was assigned to rescue the accident victims arrived at the region after 23 minutes and saved the first accident victim about one and half hours later, it is a reality that delay in the process of search and rescue operation which is carried out to save the personnel incurring hypothermia in a sea water temperature of +9 degrees reduces the chance of survival of the persons in the sea.

On the other side, the personnel of GÖKBEL were not able to see LADY AZIZA once more due to the reason that the weather was foggy and visibility was low. This circumstance is assessed to influence more adversely the psychology of the personnel of GÖKBEL who were waiting to be rescued. LADY AZIZA, at least, may follow GÖKBEL from a distance and inform the authorities about the developments, lower life rafts to save the accident victims, somewhat protect the accident victims from the influence of storm by downwind positioning, throw life jacket or life buoy when required and assist the search and rescue teams on the subject of the positions of the accident victims.

Although the Guiding Station didn't request LADY AZIZA to help the personnel of GÖKBEL , LADY AZIZA acted contrary to SOLAS Part V, Rule 33 in which the matters concerning helping people in the sea by not participating in the search and rescue works of the accident victim personnel of GÖKBEL which sank just near it.

[18] *Personal Life Saving Techniques In The Sea, ANKARA 2007*

2.8 Help of the Other Ships Around to Personnel of GÖKBEL

There exist other ships around the collided ships which are navigating and on anchor. The ship called MSC MIA SUMMER which is navigating to enter Ravenna port is at a distance of 1.93 nautical miles from the incident scene. MSC ELONORA has exited from Ravenna port under LADY AZIZA and is only 1,59 nautical miles away from the collision location. From the other ships close to the collision location, NORGAS CATHINKA is on anchor at south west 1,28 miles and FT ODIN 1,86 miles away.

Figure 21: *The Other Ships Around The Moment of Collision, 08:37:58 (VDR-AIS)*

MSC ELONORA which was proceeding to course 089 and MSC MIA SUMMER which was proceeding to course 283 before the collision quickly changed their courses to their starboards after the collision. MSC ELONORA started to navigate to course 139 and MSC MIA SUMMER to course 329 5 minutes after the collision (08:43:04).



Figure 22: *Positions of MSC ELONARA and MSC MIA SUMMER at 08:43:04(VDR-AIS).*

When MSC ELONORA passed only 0,66 mile by the collided ships at 08:50:00, MSC MIA SUMMER was directed to anchor area of Ravenna port.

Figure 23: *Positions of MSC ELONARA and MSC MIA SUMMER After Collision(VDR-AIS).*



Figure 24: *Positions of Other Ships Just Before GÖKBEL Is Lost On Screen (09:02:27)*

Then, when MSC MIA SUMMER dropped anchor at about 09:20 in the anchor area of RAVENNA port, MSC ELONORA continued navigating towards VENICE port. FT ODIN and NORGAS CATHINKA protected their position on anchor.

The expression ‘‘*2 The master of a ship in distress or the search and rescue service concerned, after consultation, so far as may be possible, with the masters of ships which answer the distress alert, has the right to requisition one or more of those ships as the master of the ship in distress or the search and rescue service considers best able to render assistance, and it shall be the duty of the master or masters of the ship or ships requisitioned to comply with the requisition by continuing to proceed with all speed to the assistance of persons in distress*.’’ is included under the sub title number 2 of title Danger Messages: Liabilities and Procedures in Part V, Rule 33 of SOLAS.

It is understood, according to VHF and VDR records, that the Ravenna Maritime Authority and Pilot Station didn’t make a help call or help organization to these ships which were very close to GÖKBEL to save the accident victims in the sea, but the other ships were sent away synchronously from the region. This may be made with the thought of carrying out the help or not causing other accidents in the dense fog. But the vessels assigned by

Ravenna Maritime Authority and Pilot Station to save the personnel of GÖKBEL could only arrive at the incident scene approximately 23 minutes after the collision due to the storm in the region. It is thought, whereas, that the other ships navigating nearby the collision location might reach the collision location in a much shorter time, therefore, assigning duties to the other ships in the rescue operation as expressed in SOLAS Part V, Rule 33 would provide an advantage to the accident victims.

2.9 Entrance and Exit Planning for Ravenna Port

Another important matter concerning the occurred accident is the visibility and sea conditions in the region where the accident occurred. It is assessed that both ships had difficulties when detecting another ship on their radars due to 4 meters high waves formed on the sea surface due to the effective storm in the region. As a matter of fact, the chief officer of GÖKBEL recognized LADY AZIZA late although he made observations on the radar to detect the ship movements in the surroundings. On the other hand, LADY AZIZA didn't recognize GÖKBEL until the moment of collision. In normal weather conditions, both ships might detect another ship on its radar much earlier and take the necessary precautions to avoid collision.

Personnel of GÖKBEL saved alive from the accident stated that forecastle was hardly seen from the bridge when anchor was raised and again, LADY AZIZA couldn't be seen until the moment of accident. On the other hand, it was indicated in the deck logbook records of LADY AZIZA concerning the visibility that a dense fog started after starting departure manoeuver and the fog continued along the channel and after the pilot disembarked. Again, when the pilot boat which participated in the rescue works reached the accident region, it stated that visibility was maximum 10 meters in the region.

While two ships simultaneously exited the port under these limited visibility and stormy sea conditions, Ravenna Maritime Authority made plans for the entrance of two ships to the port. It is assessed that making such planning without the existence of a system such as VTS with which immediate monitoring of the movements and safe passage of the ships entering and exiting the port can be provided shall lead to collision or similar risks.

It is stated in the information taken from the Ravenna Maritime Authority concerning the subject that fog was formed due to the reason that the sea water temperature was +9 degrees and air temperature at the sea surface was 1,3 degrees, planning was made for ship entrances and exits as the Ravenna Maritime Authority had no information about the existence of such dense fog. On the other hand, it can't be understood why the pilots who provided guidance service to the ships exiting the port didn't warn the Ravenna Maritime Authority on the subject of planning the entrance and exit of the ships to and from the port although they saw that the visibility conditions were such limited.

There is information about Ravenna port in NP 47 (Admiralty Sailing Directions NP47 Mediterranean Pilot) which gives general information to ships about the world ports and which is among the publications which should be present in ships and it is expressed that there exists dense fog at the port between September and March. On the other hand, the information of sea conditions is given immediately in the weather reports. In addition, information may be taken on the subject of visibility and meteorological condition reports from the pilots which provide guidance service to ships until out of the breakwater and also information may be got from the ships on anchor waiting the instructions of Ravenna Maritime Authority to enter the port.

Planning for the entrance and exit of the ships without having definite information about the visibility conditions by the port authority responsible for controlling the port's shipping has formed a weakness from the point of the port. It is assessed, although ignoring the visibility conditions out of the port isn't a direct cause for the accident, that it is included in the indirect factors which affect the occurrence of the accident.

2.10 VTS and Sea Traffic Separation Scheme

Purpose of VTS systems is to regulate sea traffic in sea waters such as straits, channels and ports where sea traffic is intensive, provide navigation safety and protect the marine environment. There doesn't exist a Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) system in Ravenna port in which the instantaneous actions of the ships can be followed. Entrance and exit of the ships to and from the port are planned by the Port Ravenna Maritime Authority. Since

instantaneous ship traffic flow can't be followed, it may not be possible to control if the ships observe the Traffic Separation Scheme regulated for Ravenna port area or international rules for the entrance and exit of the ships to and from the port. In addition, it is understood from the last two VHF conversation which took place minutes before the accident between the pilot and Pilot Station and GÖKBEL that also there doesn't exist a warning and response system for the probable dangerous situations which may occur in the entrance and exit of the ships to and from the port, the harbor pilots direct the ships with their own knowledge and experience.

In the first VHF talk, the pilot who provided guidance service on board of another ship called GÖKBEL at 08:23:20 from VHF, said the ship was dragged towards south and there were two more ships exiting from the port and asked the ship to pass these ships port to port (red to red) and change its course more towards starboard. Thereupon, GÖKBEL started to change its course towards starboard and made its course 287 to 295 at 08:25. On the other hand, the second VHF talk was realized only 1 minute and 17 seconds before the collision. In this conversation, the Pilot Station asked GÖKBEL its course and speed. GÖKBEL stated its speed as 4,2 and course 297. Thereupon, the Pilot Station gave full ahead command to the ship and GÖKBEL approved this.

In the first of these talks, the pilot on board of another ship clearly detected the location of GÖKBEL by using the radar / electronic navigation devices of that ship and made advices to GÖKBEL concerning its navigation. It is probable as a result of this advice that the master of GÖKBEL had an opinion that his ship was instantaneously followed and the pilot warned him against probable dangerous situations. On the other hand, in the last conversation between the Pilot Station and GÖKBEL, the person in charge in the guiding station made assessments as per the information provided by GÖKBEL and gave instructions to GÖKBEL to increase its speed. It is clear that this situation shall adversely affect the decision making process of the ship master who thinks that he was monitored based on the previous VHF talk and who makes manoeuvers to avoid collision.

Ships might be monitored instantaneously and sea traffic might be controlled and coordinated more healthily only with VTS system at about 2 miles off Ravenna port where

visibility was almost zero. Realization of the coordination of sea traffic with the facilities of another ship or upon the information taken from ships in the absence of such a system may lead to weaknesses in the provision of navigation safety. As a matter of fact, a navigation assistance service couldn't be given to these two ships advancing to each other in a dangerous manner and which could detect the existence of the other ship only by using their radars.

As known, the coastal states don't have any liability arising from national or international law on the subject of installation of VTS system. The coastal states decide to install a VTS system by considering the traffic intensity of the marine space or environmental factors[19]. Installation of VTS system at Ravenna port by assessing the impacts of negative visibility, weather and sea conditions which are specifically effective along the winter months may be useful for the purpose of increasing the navigation safety, decreasing accident risk and contributing to the preservation of marine environment.

In the talks made in Ravenna Maritime Authority in the scope of accident investigations, another matter expressed by the Port Authority concerning the occurrence of the accident was that there was a traffic separation scheme at the accident location and that GÖKBEL didn't observe this traffic separation scheme. The chart which includes the indicated traffic separation scheme and the drawings concerning the occurrence of accident is shown in the Figure.

[19] IMO Resolution A. 857(20)



Figure 25: *Chart*

When the mentioned chart is examined, it is seen that the chart belongs to the coastal state. In both ships, the charts prepared by Britain hydrographic office were being used. When Ravenna approach chart (Admiralty Chart 1467: Approaches to Ravenna) which should be used for the region where the accident occurred is examined (Publication Date of Chart: 18.06.2015), it is observed that the mentioned traffic separation scheme is not present in this chart. In this respect, the accident is assessed as per the charts used in the ships. Accordingly, GÖKBEL took its course to its starboard as a result of warning by the pilot while it was navigating the outer boundary of portside of the mentioned region. The ships collided at a place near to the portside central line in the port entrance direction of the mentioned region.



Figure 26: *Section from chart no BA 1467*

2.11 Departure Time of Pilot from LADY AZIZA

The time at which the pilot who guided LADY AZIZA left the ship was recorded as 08:10 to deck logbook records. But, it is seen according to VDR records of LADY AZIZA that LADY AZIZA didn't complete the channel pass of Ravenna port yet at the indicated time. It is observed in the continuation of VDR records that the navigation speed of the ship decreased from 8 knots to 7,2 knots and immediately after that, it was 9,50 at 08:25:31 and the speed of ship continued to increase. In this case, it is assessed that the pilot disembarked when the speed of ship was low and when the ship was in the breakwater. Therefore, it is thought that the disembarkation time of the pilot was incorrectly written in the logbook- records.



Figure 27: *Radar Image of LADY AZIZA (VDR)*

On the other hand, when Ravenna port approach chart (BA 1467) is examined, it is seen that the location where the harbor pilot would go on /leave the ship is out of the breakwater. There is a distance of 1,6 nautical miles between the breakwater and location where the harbor pilot would go on /leave the ship. In this case, the harbor pilot left LADY AZIZA early.

As known, pilots guide the ships which depart from the port until the location where the pilot would leave the ship and guide the ships which shall berth from the location where the pilot would disembark the ship to the dock/wharf. Under normal conditions, providing the pilot to embark the ship which shall get the service as early as possible and disembark as late as possible is a positive criterion which shall be preferred from the point of the scope and efficiency of the service. However, its feasibility and necessity differs according to the location and conditions.

Disembarkation LADY AZIZA of the pilot in the accident date before arriving at the location pointed out on the chart where the harbor pilot would leave the ship due to the reason that the visibility is was limited and sea was stormy may be a preferred selection from the point of self-safety of the pilot. But there is a distance of 1 nautical mile between the location where the ships collided and the location determined on the chart to realize the

transfer of pilot to the ships. It is assessed that disembarkation of the harbor pilot 1 mile before the disembarkation location determined on the chart doesn't comply with the piloting application obliged to ensure the safe navigation of the ships which enter and exit to and from Ravenna port.

Figure 28: *Demonstration of the Accident Scene and the Location Where the harbor pilot would embarked/disembarked the Ship on chart no BA 1467*

PART 3 – CONCLUSIONS

Safety matters concerning the occurrence of the accident are listed below:

3.1 Probable negative impact of the visibility conditions out of the port couldn't be very well analyzed when the planning of ships which shall berth to and depart from Ravenna port at the accident date.

3.2 The pilot who guided LADY AZIZA left the ship before the location where the harbor pilot embarkation/disembarkation pointed on the chart.

3.3 Limited visibility and storm effective in the region influenced the occurrence of the accident.

3.4 GÖKBEL and LADY AZIZA didn't give whistle signs expressed under the title Sound signals to be used in restricted visibility in COLREGS / Rule 35 and which they should give during navigation.

3.5 LADY AZIZA didn't consider the factors which it should bear in mind to determine the navigation speed of a ship under the title Safe Speed in COLREGS/Rule 6.

3.6 GÖKBEL observed the factors which it should bear in mind to determine the navigation speed of a ship under the title Safe Speed in COLREGS/Rule 6 to a great extent, but couldn't assess well the effect of current in the region which was among the most important factors.

3.7 LADY AZIZA couldn't determine the existence of danger of collision and GÖKBEL until the moment of collision with its electronic navigation aids (Radar and AIS) as indicated under the title Risk of Collision in Rule 7 and Conduct of vessel in restricted visibility in Rule 19 of COLREGS.

3.8 GÖKBEL didn't use its radars and existing devices in sufficient functionality to provide navigation safety as indicated under the title Risk of Collision in Rule 7

and Conduct of vessel in restricted visibility in Rule 19 of COLREGS. It couldn't realize the manoeuver to avoid collision in time as it couldn't detect LADY AZIZA in time.

3.9 Since GÖKBEL couldn't make course changes to avoid collision in a sufficient time as indicated in COLREGS/Rule 8, its course changes didn't become sufficient to avoid collision.

3.10 Although it is seen according to ISM records of GÖKBEL that "Abandonment" drills were regularly performed, the failures experienced in the abandonment of the ship after the accident shows that the personnel didn't perform the duties assigned to them on the muster cards and were not familiar with the abandonment procedures.

3.11 LADY AZIZA didn't participate in the search and rescue works for the accident victim personnel of the sank GÖKBEL and acted contrary to the provisions of SOLAS Part V, Rule 33.

3.12 Ravenna Maritime Authority / Pilot Station didn't make any help call or help organization to other ships very close of GÖKBEL as expressed in SOLAS Part V, Rule 33 for the rescue of accident victims in the sea.

3.13 A system in which the ships are instantaneously followed and information and navigation assistance services to the ships under danger is not present in Ravenna port to make a sea traffic organization under limited visibility conditions.

3.14 While one of 6 personnel saved alive from the accident of GÖKBEL lost his life due to Hypothermia, the other 5 accident victims were treated in the hospital for 1 to 5 days due to health problems originating from hypothermia.

PART 4 – RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended to:

4.1 Ravenna Maritime Authority

4.1.1 To consider the installation of a Local Vessel Traffic System (VTSL) together with the introduction of a traffic separation scheme in the Port of Ravenna, to control and coordinate the sea traffic for the purpose of increasing safety of navigation, and thus decreasing risk of collision, especially in limited visibility conditions,

4.1.2 To consider, as far as practicable, to organize other ships in the vicinity to help and rescue the victims in the case of an accident at sea around the Port of Ravenna[20],

4.1.3 To consider sea conditions, especially the visibility conditions out of the port, when entrance and exit of ships to and from the port is planned[21],

4.2 Ravenna Pilot Station

4.2.1 To observe that during the pilotage service given to ships entering into or departing from the Port of Ravenna, pilots embark to / disembark from the ships at the designated points as shown on the chart as far as practicable.

4.3 Turkish Lloyd

4.3.1 To attach importance to provide the ship personnel understand and apply ISM rules very well in the certification of the ships in its class on the subject of Safety Management Certificate (SMC),

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[20] Comment from DIGIFEMA of Italy for this recommendation is as follows: *"Normally this is carried out in accordance with Article 69 of the Italian Code of Navigation, maybe that in this case it was not put into effect due to the limited time of intervention or because other ships were too far."*

[21] Comment from DIGIFEMA of Italy for this recommendation is as follows: *"As per national and international rules, in Italy generally it is left to the responsibility of the ship's captain - who is aware of his ship's manoeuvring capabilities - to decide whether to enter / exit from the ports. Only in exceptional cases, the port traffic could be temporary prohibited by the Maritime Authority."*

4.4 M/V GÖKBEL Ship/Owner/Operator
(Ö. Çetinkaya Denizcilik Transport ve TİC.LTD.ŞTİ.)

4.4.1 To give refreshment/comprehensive training to the masters and officers employed in its fleet on the subject of understanding Bridge Resource Management (BRM) techniques and COLREGS and applying in ships,

4.4.2 To ensure that the drills to be made in accordance with ISM are made efficiently in the ships of its fleet,

4.5 M/V LADY AZIZA /Owner/Operator (KHM SHIPPING CO.LTD.)

4.5.1 To give refreshment training to the masters and officers employed in its fleet on the subject of understanding COLREGS and applying in ships,

4.5.2 To give a comprehensive training to the masters and officers employed in its fleet on the subject of helping the ships which need help in accordance with International rules (SOLAS),

4.6 Directorate General of Maritime and Inland Waters Regulation

4.6.1 To be sensitive on the matter that abandonment drills are effectively performed in the surveys, certification and audits performed in the scope of ISM code.

Content of this Report may not be used for the purpose of accusing the persons or sharing responsibility among the parties.

ANNEX-1 Chart List Present in GÖKBEL

Ö.ÇETİNKAYA DENİZCİLİK TRANSPORT ve TİCARET LTD. ŞTİ.				
EMNİYETLİ YÖNETİM SİSTEMİ / *SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM*				F 07.20
GEMİDE BULUNAN HARİTA LİSTESİ				
Yayınlayan / *Issued by* **Y.K. / *D.P.A.***	Onaylayan / *Approved by* **Genel Müdür / *Gen. Mngr.***	Tarih / *Date* **01.02.2013**	Yayın / *Issue* **ORIJINAL**	Sayfa / *Page* 1 of 1

GEMİDE BULUNAN HARİTA LİSTESİ

SON GÜNCELLENME TARİHİ : 07 ARALIK 2015 GEMİ: MV GOKBEL

B/A NO	SON BASIM TARİHİ	GEMİDEKİ BASIM	GEMİYE TESLİM TARİHİ	SON DÜZELTME NO VE DURUMU
9	24 OCT 1986	24 OCT 1986		49.WEEK
140	JULY 2013	JULY 2013		49.WEEK
176	MAY 2007	MAY 2007		49.WEEK
180	DEC 1998	DEC 1998		49.WEEK
183	MAR 1992	MAR 1992		49.WEEK
186	JUN 2011	JUN 2011		49.WEEK
7	JULY 2010	JULY 2010		49.WEEK
188	AUGUST 2013	AUGUST 2013		49.WEEK
189	AUGUST 2010	AUGUST 2010		49.WEEK
194	AUGUST 2008	AUGUST 2008		49.WEEK
196	JAN 1994	JAN 1994		49.WEEK
200	NOV 2013	NOV 2013		49.WEEK
203	MAR 2014	MAR 2014		49.WEEK
204	NOV 2013	NOV 2013		49.WEEK
205	APR. 2008	APR. 2008		49.WEEK
220	NOV 2013	NOV 2013		49.WEEK
236	APR. 2010	APR. 2010		49.WEEK
237	APR. 2010	APR. 2010		49.WEEK
240	MAR 2008	MAR 2008		49.WEEK
241	SEP 2004	23.09.2004		49.WEEK
246	FEB 2013	FEB 2013		49.WEEK
497	SEPT 2014	SEPT 2014		49.WEEK
908	NOV 2013	NOV 2013		49.WEEK
917	JUN 2013	JUN 2013		49.WEEK
4	APR 2013	APR 2013		49.WEEK
1004	OCT 2013	OCT 2013		49.WEEK
1005	OCT 2013	OCT 2013		49.WEEK
1006	OCT 2013	OCT 2013		49.WEEK
1015	JUN 2013	JUN 2013		49.WEEK
1030	JULY 2014	JULY 2014		49.WEEK
1054	MAY 1995	OCT 2012		49.WEEK
1055	NOV 2010	APR 2013		49.WEEK
1056	NOV 2010	NOV 2010		49.WEEK
1057	NOV 2010	NOV 2010		49.WEEK
1058	SEP 2013	SEP 2013		49.WEEK
1061	DEC 2013	OCT 2013		49.WEEK
1062	AUGUST 2010	AUGUST 2010		49.WEEK
1085	SEP 2010	SEP 2010		49.WEEK
1086	SEP.2010	SEP.2010		49.WEEK
1087	NOV 2013	NOV 2013		49.WEEK
1091	NOV 2010	NOV 2010		49.WEEK
1092	OCT 2010	OCT 2010		49.WEEK
1093	DEC 2010	DEC 2010		49.WEEK
1095	OCT 2010	OCT 2010		49.WEEK
1099	NOV 210	NOV 210		49.WEEK
1158	SEP 2012	SEP 2012		49.WEEK

B/A NO	SON BASIM TARİHİ	GEMİDEKİ BASIM	GEMİYE TESLİM TARİHİ	SON DÜZELTME NO VE DURUMU
1159	SEP 2012	SEP 2012		49.WEEK
1195	JUN 2013	JUN 2013		49.WEEK
1274	OCT 2013	OCT 2013		49.WEEK
1417	JUN 2010	JUN 2010		49.WEEK
1439	DEC 2005	DEC 2005		49.WEEK
1440	MAY 2007	MAY 2007		49.WEEK
1442	JULY 2011	JULY 2011		49.WEEK
1445	SEP 2010	SEP 2010		49.WEEK
1449	FEB 2010	FEB 2010		49.WEEK
1467	JULY 2010	JULY 2010		49.WEEK
1471	JAN 2012	JAN 2012		49.WEEK
1483	MAR 2010	MAR 2010		49.WEEK
1513	AUGUST 2010	AUGUST 2010		49.WEEK
1554	AUGUST 2010	AUGUST 2010		49.WEEK
1556	SEP 2010	SEP 2010		49.WEEK
1571	AUGUST 2010	AUGUST 2010		49.WEEK
1585	DEC 2009	DEC 2009		49.WEEK
1590	JAN 2011	JAN 2011		49.WEEK
1591	MAR 2009	MAR 2009		49.WEEK
1598	AUGUST 2010	AUGUST 2010		49.WEEK
1608	SEP 2010	SEP 2010		49.WEEK
1618	AUGUST 2013	AUGUST 2013		49.WEEK
1643	JULY 2004	JULY 2004		49.WEEK
1657	JULY 2014	JULY 2014		49.WEEK
1707	NOV 2010	NOV 2010		49.WEEK
1780	MAR 1993	MAR 1993		49.WEEK
1908	JAN 2014	JAN 2014		49.WEEK
1941	MAY 2010	MAY 2010		49.WEEK
1976	MAY 2010	MAY 2010		49.WEEK
1996	JUN 2010	JUN 2010		49.WEEK
1999	JUN 2010	JUN 2010		49.WEEK
2070	OCT 2010	OCT 2010		49.WEEK
2074	OCT 1998	OCT 1998		49.WEEK
2104	FEB 2013	FEB 2013		49.WEEK
2124	MAR 2014	MAR 2014		49.WEEK
2202	NOV 2011	NOV 2011		49.WEEK
2203	MAR 2011	MAR 2011		49.WEEK
2214	FEB 2012	FEB 2012		49.WEEK
2216	MAR 2010	MAR 2010		49.WEEK
2217	DEC 2009	DEC 2009		49.WEEK
2230	APR 2012	APR 2012		49.WEEK
2232	JAN 2013	JAN 2013		49.WEEK
2236	NOV 2010	NOV 2010		49.WEEK
2237	APRIL 2010	APRIL 2010		49.WEEK
2238	SEPT 2012	SEPT 2012		49.WEEK
2242	MAY 2009	MAY 2009		49.WEEK

P.D.M.

ANNEX-2 : Control Certificates of Life Jackets and Immersion Suits

INSPECTION REPORT

Inspection Date: 08.08.2014

Inspection Service: ISTANBUL

Inspection No : SL/78/30/14/0563

VESSEL NAME : M/V GOKBEL

IMO : 9605712

GROSS TONNAGE : 2126

"FOR 19 Pcs.OF IMMERSION SUIT'S"

The below mentioned **"IMMERSION SUIT"**checked and tested with pressured air and hereby certificated to be in accordance with MANUFACTURER and (MSC/Circ. 1114 air test) requirements. Those products are in good condition.

QTY	MAKER	SERIAL NUMBER	MANUFACTURE DATE	WHISTLE
1.	STEARNS	021899	03/2003	V
2.	STEARNS	227440	02/2006	V
3.	STEARNS	021717	03/2003	V
4.	STEARNS	227449	02/2006	V
5.	STEARNS	227418	02/2006	V
6.	STEARNS	227150	02/2006	V
7.	STEARNS	227109	02/2006	V
8.	STEARNS	227436	02/2006	V
9.	STEARNS	233276	02/2006	V
10.	STEARNS	227153	02/2006	V
11.	STEARNS	233389	02/2006	V
12.	STEARNS	217115	02/2006	V
13.	STEARNS	233029	02/2006	V
14.	LALIZAS	0139044	01/2006	V
15.	SPORTECH	108	08/2011	V
16.	STEARNS	021724	02/2006	V
17.	STEARNS	233238	02/2006	V
18.	STEARNS	217150	02/2006	V
19.	STEARNS	661927	02/2006	V

EXPERT ALTANLAR 2014 SERVICE ISTANBUL

ALTANLAR

YANGIN SÖNDÜRME GÜVENLİK SİSTEMLERİ VE GEMİ İNŞAA BAKIM ONARIM TİCARET LİMİTED ŞİRKETİ

Next Inspection Date:08.08.2015

INSPECTION REPORT

Inspection Date: 08.08.2014

Inspection Service: ISTANBUL

Inspection No : SL/78/30/14/0563

VESSEL NAME : M/V GOKBEL

IMO : 9605712

GROSS TONNAGE : 2126

SHIP

"FOR 21 Pcs.LIFE JACKET'S"
(19 Pcs.Adult & 2 Pcs.Child)

The above mentioned "**LIFE JACKET** "checked and hereby certificated to be in accordance with MANUFACTURER requirements. Those products are in good condition.

EXPERT ALTANLAR 2014 SERVICE ISTANBUL

ALTANLAR

YANGIN SÖNDÜRME GÜVENLİK SİSTEMLERİ
VE GEMİ İNŞAA BAKIM ONARIM TİCARET LİMİTED ŞİRKETİ
Mrkz : Evliya Çelebi Mh. Genç Osman Cd. No:26 34744 İçmeler-Tuzla / İST.
Tel.: (0216) 446 21 05 Pbx - Fax: (0216) 395 90 83
İstanbul Şube: Aydınlı Organize Deri Yan San. 4. Yol Tuzla / İST.
Tel.: (0216) 591 03 01 - 02
Mersin Şube: Özgürlük Mh. Yeni Gıda Toptancılar Sitesi D :Blok No:83 Mersin Tel.: (0324) 235 91 92
İzmir Şube : S.S. Aliağa Küçük Sanayi Sitesi 1250 Sokak 172/1 Parsel No:3/4 Aliağa / İZMİR Tel.: (0232) 618 00 62
e-mail : info@altanlar.com.tr

Next Inspection Date:08.08.2015

ANNEX-3: Certificates That Life Rafts and Materials Within Are Examined and Found Suitable



A member of
INFLATABLE SAFETY AND
SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT
TRADE ASSOCIATION LIMITED
ISSETTA FORM NO 197

RFD

Certificate No. 2193636

CERTIFICATE OF RE-INSPECTION

This is to certify that the raft detailed below has been surveyed, controlled and tested in compliance with requirements from: Other and the manufacturer and in accordance with IMO resolution A.761 (18)

Inflatable Liferaft

Identification:

Type:		Serial Number:	Date of Manufacture:
RFD Surviva Mk IV DL		5086610100055	May-2008
Fabric Type:	Capacity:	Length of Painter:	Max Stowage height:
Natural Rubber	20	28 m/inside 1 m/outside	18 m

Cylinders:

Serial No.	Contents CO2	Contents N2	Latest hyd. test
10303024	11.260kg	0.360kg	Jul-2013

Equipment:

Unit	Type	Serial No.	Expiry date
Emergency pack:	Solas A	5086610100055	Aug-2015
EPIRB:			
HRU test:	HAMMAR	L 49518	Aug-2015
Radar Reflector:	KR-1	78012	
First aid kit:	RFD		Nov-2017

Unit	Serial No.	Date of Manufacture
Humidity/CO2 Sensor	24026	Jul-2013

Tests:

Nap-test	Gas inflation test	Floor seam test	Load test davit launched
Yes/No No	Yes/No No	Yes/No No	Yes/No Yes
Latest Test:	Latest Test: Aug-2013	Latest Test:	Latest Test: Aug-2014

Verification:

Date of inspection:	Service Station name and No.	Date issued to ship:
08-Aug-2014	50666: Altanlar Yangin Sondurme Guv Sis Ve Head Office	08-Aug-2014
National Marine authority ID No.	Remarks/modification:	

According to SOLAS regulation, this inflatable liferaft requires servicing within 12 months from the date of inspection (above).

Flagstate of ship: Turkey

IMO No. 9605712

International call signal TCZY4

Name of ship: GOKBEL

Ship owner: OMER CETINKAYA DENIZCILIK

Serkan Altin

For authorized servicing station

Signature

EXPERT ALTANLAR SHIP SERVICE ISTANBUL 2014

Survitec Group Limited - Registered Office, 1 – 5 Beaufort Road, Birkenhead, Merseyside, England, CH41 1HE
Email: info@survitecgroup.com

ALTANLAR

CANSALI BAKIM TABLOSU
LIFERAFT SURVEY WORK STATEMENT

GEMİ ADI (SHIP'S NAME)	GOKBEL	RPT NO.:	2193636
ARMATÖRÜ (OWNER OF SHIP)	OMER CETINKAYA DENIZCILIK	TARİH (DATE)	08-Aug-2014
CANSALI MARKASI (RAFT BRAND)	RFD		
CANSALI TİPİ (RAFT TYPE)	RFD Surviva Mk IV DL		
SERİ NO. (SERIAL NO.)	5086610100055	EMERGENCY PACK:	Solas A
KİŞİ ADEDİ (CAPACITY)	20	PAKETLEME (PACKED IN)	CONT.
İMAL TARİHİ (DATE OF MAN.)	May-2008	PAINTER LINE	28 MTR

DIŞ KABUK TAMİRLERİ (CONTAINER / BAG REPAIRS)

TAMİR/BOYAMA	1 ADET

CANSALI GÖVDE BAKIMLARI (MAIN BODY TESTS)

	BAŞLAMA ON	BASINÇ PRESSURE	BİTİŞ OFF	BASINÇ PRESSURE	ISI FARKI TEMP VAR.	AÇ OPEN	KAPA CLOSE
ÜST UPPER	10:00	157mmHg	11:00	157mmHg		210mmHg	170mmHg
ALT LOWER	10:00	157mmHg	11:00	157mmHg		205mmHg	165mmHg
YER FLOOR	10:00	15mmHg	11:00	15mmHg			
DİREK ARCH							

GÖVDE TAMİRLERİ (MAIN BODY REPAIRS)

CANOPY TAMİRLERİ (CANOPY REPAIRS)

CO_2 TÜPÜ TESTLERİ (GAS CYLINDER TESTS)

1. TÜP NO. (1 CYLINDER NO.):	10303024	Jul-2013
2. TÜP NO. (2 CYLINDER NO.):		

EMERGENCY PACK BAKIMLARI (EMERGENCY PACK CHANGES)

PARAŞÜT FİŞEĞİ (PARACHUTE ROCKETS)	4r Lot no:1023
EL MAYTABI (HANDFLARES)	6r Lot no:2114004
DUMAN İŞARETİ (SMOKE SIGNALS)	2r Lot no:3014004
EL LAMBASI (HANDLAMP)	
EL LAMBASI AMPULÜ (BULB)	
EL LAMBASI PİLİ (BATTERIES)	4r
DÜDÜK (WHISTLE)	
İŞARET AYNASI (HELIOGRAPH)	
PEKSİMET (FOOD RATIONS) 500GR	20r Lot no:L11402
DENİZ DEMİRİ (DROGUE)	
MAKAS SETİ (SCISSOR SET)	
KUSMA TORBASI (SEASICKNESS BAGS)	
KURTARMA HALKASI (QUOIT W. LINE)	
KÜREK (PADDLES)	
DENİZ PİLİ (LIFERAFT BATTERY)	1r Lot no:005086
SU (WATER) 500ML	60r Lot no:538
SU BARDAĞI (DRINKING CUP)	
ISISAL ELBİSE (T.P.A.)	
ORJİNAL SERTİFİKA	1
GI TESTİ	

AÇACAK (CAN OPENER)	
OLTA SETİ (FISHING TACKLE)	
BULANTI TABLETİ (SEASICKNESS TABLETS)	120r
SU TAHLİYE KABI (BAILER)	
SÜNGER (SPONGE)	
YAŞAM BİLGİ KARTI (SURVIVAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
KURTARMA İŞARETLERİ KARTI (SIGNALLING INS	
ÇAKI (FLOATNIG KNIFE)	
YAPISTIRICI (GLUE FOR REPAIR KIT)	1r
İLAÇ KUTUSU YENİLEMESİ (FIRST AID KIT)	1r Lot no:18154
MERHEM (OINTMENT)	
AĞRI KESİCİ (PAIN KILLER)	
OKSİJENLİ SU (LIQUID OXYGEN)	
TENTÜRDİYOT (IODINE)	
HIRU TESTİ (HIRU TEST)	
NAP TESTİ (NAP TEST)	
FS TESTİ (FS TEST)	

KAPATMA MALZEMELERİ (CLOSING MATERIALS)

İÇ TORBALAMA	1 ADET	ETİKET SETİ	1 ADET

AUTHORIZED RFD SEVICE/ISTANBUL BASE 50838

EXPERT ALTANLAR Tel: 0216 446 31 05 Fax: 0216 302 00 83 2014 SHIP SERVICE İSTANBUL

ALTANLAR

MİYAT TABLOSU

EXPIRY DATE LIST

GEMİ ADI (SHIP'S NAME)	GOKBEL
ARMATÖRÜ (OWNER OF SHIP)	OMER CETINKAYA DENIZCILIK
CANSALI MARKASI (RAFT BRAND)	RFD
CANSALI TİPİ (RAFT TYPE)	RFD Surviva Mk IV DL
SERİ NO. (SERIAL NO.)	5086610100055
KİŞİ ADEDİ (CAPACITY)	20
İMAL TARİHİ (DATE OF MAN.)	May-2008

RPT NO.: 2193636
TARİH (DATE) 08-Aug-2014

EMERGENCY PACK: Solas A
PAKETLEME (PACKED IN) CONT.

GÖNDEREN:

MALZEME DEĞİŞİM TARİHLERİ (EQUIPMENT EXPIRY DATES)

PARAŞÜT FİŞEĞİ (PARACHUTE ROCKETS)	06.17
EL MAYTABI (HANDFLARES)	07.17
DUMAN İŞARETİ (SMOKE SIGNALS)	06.17
EL LAMBASI (HANDLAMP)	
EL LAMBASI AMPULÜ (BULB)	
EL LAMBASI PİLİ (BATTERIES)	08.15
DÜDÜK (WHISTLE)	
İŞARET AYNASI (HELIOGRAPH)	
PEKSİMET (FOOD RATIONS) 500GR	12.18
DENİZ DEMİRİ (DROGUE)	
MAKAS SETİ (SCISSOR SET)	
KUSMA TORBASI (SEASICKNESS BAGS)	
KURTARMA HALKASI (QUOIT W. LINE)	
KÜREK (PADDLES)	
DENİZ PİLİ (LIFERAFT BATTERY)	06.17
SU (WATER) 500ML	12.18
SU BARDAĞI (DRINKING CUP)	
İSİSAL ELBİSE (T.P.A.)	
ORJİNAL SERTİFİKA	

AÇACAK (CAN OPENER)	
OLTA SETİ (FISHING TACKLE)	
BULANTI TABLETİ (SEASICKNESS TABLETS)	07.18
SU TAHLİYE KABI (BAILER)	
SÜNGER (SPONGE)	
YAŞAM BİLGİ KARTI (SURVIVAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
KURTARMA İŞARETLERİ KARTI (SIGNALLING INST	
ÇAKI (FLOATNIG KNIFE)	
YAPIŞTIRICI (GLUE FOR REPAIR KIT)	08.15
İLAÇ KUTUSU YENİLEMESİ (FIRST AID KIT)	11.17
MERHEM (OINTMENT)	
AĞRI KESİCİ (PAIN KILLER)	
OKSİJENLİ SU (LIQUID OXYGEN)	
TENTÜRDİYOT (IODINE)	
HRU TESTİ (HRU TEST)	
NAP TESTİ (NAP TEST)	
FS TESTİ (FS TEST)	
GI TESTİ	

AUTHORIZED RFD SERVICE ISTANBUL BASE 50606

EXPERT ALTANLAR Tel: 0216 446 21 06 Fax: 0216 395 90 85 2014 SHIP SERVICE ISTANBUL

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SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT
TRADE ASSOCIATION LIMITED
ISSETTA FORM NO 197

RFD

Certificate No. 2193637

CERTIFICATE OF RE-INSPECTION

This is to certify that the raft detailed below has been surveyed, controlled and tested in compliance with requirements from:
Other and the manufacturer and in accordance with IMO resolution A.761 (18)

Inflatable Liferaft

Identification:

Type:		Serial Number:	Date of Manufacture:
RFD Surviva Mk IV TO		**5086110100454**	**Jun-2008**
Fabric Type:	Capacity:	Length of Painter:	Max Stowage height:
Natural Rubber	**16**	**28** m/inside **1** m/outside	**18** m

Cylinders:

Serial No.	Contents CO2	Contents N2	Latest hyd. test
10303472	7.180kg	0.360kg	Aug-2014

Equipment:

Unit	Type	Serial No.	Expiry date
Emergency pack:	Solas A	5086110100454	Aug-2015
EPIRB:			
HRU test:	HAMMAR	L 49534	Aug-2015
Radar Reflector:	KR-1	79231	
First aid kit:	RFD		Nov-2017

Unit	Serial No.	Date of Manufacture
Humidity/CO2 Sensor:	24026	Jul-2013

Tests:

Nap-test		Gas inflation test		Floor seam test		Load test davit launched	
Yes/No	No	Yes/No	No	Yes/No	No	Yes/No	No
Latest Test:		Latest Test:	Aug-2013	Latest Test:		Latest Test:	

Verification:

Date of inspection:	Service Station name and No.	Date issued to ship:
08-Aug-2014	**50666: Altanlar Yangin Sondurme Guy Sis Ve Head Office**	**08-Aug-2014**
National Marine authority ID No.	Remarks/modification:	

According to SOLAS regulation, this inflatable liferaft requires servicing within 12 months from the date of inspection (above).

Serkan Altin
For authorized servicing station
Signature

Flagstate of ship: Turkey
IMO No. 9605712
International call signal TCZY4
Name of ship: GOKBEL
Ship owner: OMER CETINKAYA DENIZCILIK

EXPERT ALTANLAR 2014 SHIP SERVICE ISTANBUL
RFD SERVICE-ISTANBUL BASE-50666

Survitec Group Limited - Registered Office, 1 - 5 Beaufort Road, Birkenhead, Merseyside, England, CH41 1HQ
Email: info@survitecgroup.com

ALTANLAR

CANSALI BAKIM TABLOSU

LIFERAFT SURVEY WORK STATEMENT

GEMİ ADI (SHIP'S NAME)	GOKBEL	RPT NO.:	2193637
ARMATÖRÜ (OWNER OF SHIP)	OMER CETINKAYA DENIZCILIK	TARİH (DATE)	08-Aug-2014
CANSALI MARKASI (RAFT BRAND)	RFD		
CANSALI TİPİ (RAFT TYPE)	RFD Surviva Mk IV TO	EMERGENCY PACK:	Solas A
SERİ NO. (SERIAL NO.)	5086110100454	PAKETLEME (PACKED IN)	CONT.
KİŞİ ADEDİ (CAPACITY)	16	PAINTER LINE	28 MTR
İMAL TARİHİ (DATE OF MAN.)	Jun-2008		

DIŞ KABUK TAMİRLERİ (CONTAINER / BAG REPAIRS)

TAMİR/BOYAMA	1 ADET

CANSALI GÖVDE BAKIMLARI (MAIN BODY TESTS)

	BAŞLAMA ON	BASINÇ PRESSURE	BİTİŞ OFF	BASINÇ PRESSURE	ISI FARKI TEMP. VAR.	AÇ OPEN	KAPA CLOSE
ÜST UPPER	10:00	157mmHg	11:00	157mmHg		210mmHg	170mmHg
ALT LOWER	10:00	157mmHg	11:00	157mmHg		205mmHg	165mmHg
YER FLOOR	10:00	15mmHg	11:00	15mmHg			
DİREK ARCH							

GÖVDE TAMİRLERİ (MAIN BODY REPAIRS)

CANOPY TAMİRLERİ (CANOPY REPAIRS)

CO, TÜPÜ TESTLERİ (GAS CYLINDER TESTS)

1. TÜP NO. (1 CYLINDER NO.):	10303472	Aug-2014
2. TÜP NO. (2 CYLINDER NO.):		

EMERGENCY PACK BAKIMLARI (EMERGENCY PACK CHANGES)

PARAŞÜT FİŞEĞİ (PARACHUTE ROCKETS)	4r Lot no:1023	AÇACAK (CAN OPENER)	
EL MAYTABI (HANDFLARES)	6r Lot no:2114004	OLTA SETİ (FISHING TACKLE)	
DUMAN İŞARETİ (SMOKE SIGNALS)	2r Lot no:3014004	BULANTI TABLETİ (SEASICKNESS TABLETS)	120r
EL LAMBASI (HANDLAMP)		SU TAHLİYE KABI (BAILER)	
EL LAMBASI AMPULÜ (BULB)		SÜNGER (SPONGE)	
EL LAMBASI PİLİ (BATTERIES)	4r	YAŞAM BİLGİ KARTI (SURVIVAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
DÜDÜK (WHISTLE)		KURTARMA İŞARETLERİ KARTI (SIGNALLING INS	
İŞARET AYNASI (HELIOGRAPH)		ÇAKI (FLOATNIG KNIFE)	
PEKSİMET (FOOD RATIONS) 500GR	16r Lot no:L11402	YAPIŞTIRICI (GLUE FOR REPAIR KIT)	1r
DENİZ DEMİRİ (DROGUE)		İLAÇ KUTUSU YENİLEMESİ (FIRST AID KIT)	1r Lot no:18154
MAKAS SETİ (SCISSOR SET)		MERHEM (OINTMENT)	
KUSMA TORBASI (SEASICKNESS BAGS)		AĞRI KESİCİ (PAIN KILLER)	
KURTARMA HALKASI (QUOIT W. LINE)		OKSİJENLİ SU (LIQUID OXYGEN)	
KÜREK (PADDLES)		TENTÜRDİYOT (IODINE)	
DENİZ PİLİ (LIFERAFT BATTERY)	1r Lot no:005087	HIRU TESTİ (HIRU TEST)	
SU (WATER) 500ML	48r Lot no:538	NAP TESTİ (NAP TEST)	
SU BARDAĞI (DRINKING CUP)		FS TESTİ (FS TEST)	
ISISAL ELBİSE (T.P.A.)			
ORJİNAL SERTİFİKA	1		
GI TESTİ			

KAPATMA MALZEMELERİ (CLOSING MATERIALS)

İÇ TORBALAMA	1 ADET	ETİKET SETİ	1 ADET

AUTHORIZED
RFD
DEVISE-ISTANBUL
BASE STATION

EXPERT
ALTANLAR
SHIP SERVICE ISTANBUL
2014

ALTANLAR

MİYAT TABLOSU

EXPIRY DATE LIST

GEMİ ADI (SHIP'S NAME)	GOKBEL
ARMATÖRÜ (OWNER OF SHIP)	OMER CETINKAYA DENIZCILIK
CANSALI MARKASI (RAFT BRAND)	RFD
CANSALI TİPİ (RAFT TYPE)	RFD Surviva Mk IV TO
SERİ NO. (SERIAL NO.)	5086110100454
KİŞİ ADEDİ (CAPACITY)	16
İMAL TARİHİ (DATE OF MAN.)	Jun-2008

RPT NO.: 2193637
TARİH (DATE): 08-Aug-2014

EMERGENCY PACK: Solas A
PAKETLEME (PACKED IN): CONT.

GÖNDEREN:

MALZEME DEĞİŞİM TARİHLERİ (EQUIPMENT EXPIRY DATES)

PARAŞÜT FİŞEĞİ (PARACHUTE ROCKETS)	06.17
EL MAYTABI (HANDFLARES)	07.17
DUMAN İŞARETİ (SMOKE SIGNALS)	06.17
EL LAMBASI (HANDLAMP)	
EL LAMBASI AMPULÜ (BULB)	
EL LAMBASI PİLİ (BATTERIES)	08.15
DÜDÜK (WHISTLE)	
İŞARET AYNASI (HELIOGRAPH)	
PEKSİMET (FOOD RATIONS) 500GR	12.18
DENİZ DEMİRİ (DROGUE)	
MAKAS SETİ (SCISSOR SET)	
KUSMA TORBASI (SEASICKNESS BAGS)	
KURTARMA HALKASI (QUOIT W. LINE)	
KÜREK (PADDLES)	
DENİZ PİLİ (LIFERAFT BATTERY)	07.18
SU (WATER) 500ML	12.18
SU BARDAĞI (DRINKING CUP)	
ISISAL ELBİSE (T.P.A.)	
ORJİNAL SERTİFİKA	

AÇACAK (CAN OPENER)	
OLTA SETİ (FISHING TACKLE)	
BULANTI TABLETİ (SEASICKNESS TABLETS)	07.18
SU TAHLİYE KABI (BAILER)	
SÜNGER (SPONGE)	
YAŞAM BİLGİ KARTI (SURVIVAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
KURTARMA İŞARETLERİ KARTI (SIGNALLING INST	
ÇAKI (FLOATNIG KNIFE)	
YAPIŞTIRICI (GLUE FOR RFPAIR KIT)	08.15
İLAÇ KUTUSU YENİLEMESİ (FIRST AID KIT)	11.17
MERHEM (OINTMENT)	
AĞRI KESİCİ (PAIN KILLER)	
OKSİJENLİ SU (LIQUID OXYGEN)	
TENTÜRDİYOT (IODINE)	
HRU TESTİ (HRU TEST)	
NAP TESTİ (NAP TEST)	
FS TESTİ (FS TEST)	
GI TESTİ	

AUTHORIZED RFD SEVICE ISTANBUL BASE 6/686

EXPERT ALTANLAR 2014 SHIP SERVICE ISTANBUL

ANNEX-4: ISM records concerning Rescue Boat, Rescue Boat Lowering Equipment, Life rafts and Placement Equipment, and Personal Life Saving Tools



Ö.ÇETİNKAYA DENİZCİLİK TRANSPORT ve TİCARET LTD. ŞTİ.
EMNİYETLİ YÖNETİM SİS. / EMI / SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
GUVERTE AYLIK TEST VE KONTROLLER

F 10.03 A

Yayınlayan / Issued by	Onaylayan / Approved by	Tarih / Date	Yayın /	Sayfa / Page
Y.K. / D.P.A.	Genel Müdür / Gen. Mngr.	01.02.2013	1	1 of 2

AYLIK

İK TEST VE KONTROL LİSTESİ — Gemi adı:M/V GÖKBEL — Ay/Yıl: KASIM / 2014

CAN KURTARMA ARAÇLARI

	TANIMLAMA	KONTROL NOKTALARI	AÇIKLAMALAR	SONUÇ	TARİH	SORUMLU
	KURTARMA BOTLARI (SOLAS R.III/41-48)	* Tekne içinin ve dışının durum kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
		* Teknenin her iki tarafında bulunması gereken tutamaç halatların kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Tekne üzerinde bulunması gereken yansıtıcı bantların kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Makinenin, temelinin ve egzost çıkış borusunun kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Pervanenin ve şaftın kavramalarıyla birlikte kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Dümen rodunun, dümenin, dümen yekesinin ve kıç bodoslamanın kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
	CAN KURTARMA BOTLARININ İNDİRME DONANIMLARI (SOLAS R.III/48)	* Güverte kaplamasının ve durumunun ve indirme donanınlarının güverteye bağlantılarının kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
		* Can kurtarma botlarının indirme donanımlarının korozyon açısından kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Makaraların ,mapaların ve diğer donanımların kontrolü.	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Vinçlerin,kastanyolaların ve geri alma sistemlerinin ve Limit swiçlerin çalısır olduğunun kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Halat donanımın son olarak ne zaman tersine çevirildiğinin kontrolü (her 5 yılda en az bir kez değiştirilmelidir.)	halatın ters çevrilme tarihi : 17.09.2012 donanımın değişim tarihi : 17.09.2012	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Binme Güvertesindeki emercensi ışıklandırmanın çalıştığının kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Hareketli donanımların gresle yağlanması	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
3.	CAN SALLARI VE YERLEŞTİRME DONANIMLARI SOLAS R III/38,39	* Can sallarının ve yerleştirme donanımlarının genel kontrolleri	iskele : YENİSİYLE DEĞİŞTİRİLDİ sancak : YENİSİYLE DEĞİŞTİRİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
		* Şeytan çarmıhlarının kontrolü	iskele : KONTROL EDİLDİ sancak : KONTROL EDILDI	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Şişebilir can sallarının 12 ayı aşmayacak sürelerde servise gönderildiğinin kontrolü	iskele : KONTROL EDİLDİ sancak : KONTROL EDILDI	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Hidrostatik bırakma mekanızmasının 12 ayı aşmayacak sürelerde servise gönderildiğinin kontrolü	iskele : KONTROL EDİLDİ sancak : KONTROL EDILDI	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Yansıtıcı bantların kontrolü	iskele : KONTROL EDİLDİ sancak : KONTROL EDILDI	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Serbest yüzme donanımlarının kontrolü(bağlantılar uygun mu , serbest yüzmeyi engelleyecek durumlar söz konusu mu vs.?)	iskele : KONTROL EDİLDİ sancak : KONTROL EDILDI	İYİ	04.11.2014	
1.4.	KİŞİSEL CAN KURTARMA ARAÇLARI SOLAS R III/31, 32,33	* Gemideki herkes için yansıtıcı bantlı,ışıklı ve düdüklü can yeleğinin var olduğu	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
		* Can yeleklerinin ışıklarını besleyen pillerin geçerlilik süresinin kontrolu	expire: 11/2014	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Can kurtarma aracı istasyonlarında kullanılması için ve vardiyadaki gemi adamları için ek can yelekleri bulunduğunun kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	

Sayfa 1 / 2

	TANIMLAMA	İSTEKLER	AÇIKLAMALAR	SONUÇ	TARİH	SORUMLU
	DALMA GİYSİLERİ (IMMERSION SUIT)	* Gemideki herkes için yansıtıcı bantlı,ışıklı ve düdüklü dalma giysisinin var olduğu	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
		*Dalma giysilerinin ışıklarını besleyen pillerin geçerlilik süresinin kontrolü	expire: 15.09.2013	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		Vardiyadaki gemi adamları için yedek dalma giysisi varmı	EVET	İYİ	04.11.2014	
	CAN SİMİTLERİ SOLAS R III/21 or R.III/7.1,27,1,31	* Gemi boyuna bağlı olarak ,işaretli ve ışık yansıtıcı bantlı can simitlerinin sayısının kontrolü Gemi boyu < 100 m 8 adet 100m<Gemi boyu < 150 m 10 adet 150m<Gemi boyu < 200 m 12 adet Gemi boyu> 200 m 14 adet	gemi toplam mevcudu: 8	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
		* Gemide her iki tarafta birer tane olmak üzere en az iki adet kendiliğinden yanan ışıklı can simidi bulunduğunun kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
		* Kendiliğinden yanan ışıkların aydınlatma durumunun kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Geminin her iki tarafından birer adet yüzer halatlı(halat boyu=30 m veya can simitlerinin istif poziyonundan denize olan dikey mesafelerinin iki katı - hangi mesafe daha uzunsa-) can simidi bulunduğunun kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Yansıtıcı bantları, markalamalarının kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Gemide kendiliğinden yanan ışıklı ve yüzer duman işaretli 2 can simidi bulunduğunun kontrolü (Bu can simitleri köprü üzerinde çabuk düşürülebilecek şekilde yerleştirilmiş ve en az 4 kg ağırlığında olmalıdırlar (Man over board)	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	
		* Kendiliğinden yanan ışıkların aydınlatma durumlarının ,yüzer duman işaretlerinin geçerlilik süresinin ve düşürme donanımlarının kontrolü (Man over board)	iskele MOB expire: 04/2016 Sancak MOB expire: 04/2016	İYİ	04.11.2014 04.11.2014	
6	PAYROTECHNICS (SOLAS R.III/6 3, 35)	* Gemide en az 12 adet paraşütlü işaret fişeğinin bulunduğunun ve tarihlerinin geçerli olduklarının kontrolü	expire: 05/2017	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
		* gemide en az 4 adet halat atma aleti bulunduğunun ve roketlerinin tarihlerinin geçerli olduklarının kontrolü	expire: 08/2015	İYİ	04.11.2014	
7	EPIRB	* Epirbin konumunun serbest yüzme için kontrolü * Pilin ve hidrostatik serbest bırakma donanımının son kullanma tarihinin teyidi * Cihazın üreticisinin talimatları doğrultusunda test edilmesi * Epirbin üzerinde, bulunduğu gemiye ait tanınma numarasının işaretlenmiş olduğunun kontrolü	Pil expire tarihi: 03/2016 HRU expire tarihi: 05/2015 KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ İYİ İYİ	04.11.2014 04.11.2014 04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
8	EL VHF'LERİ	* GMDSS taleplerine uygun 3 adet el vhf'inin bulunduğunun kontrolü * Bu VHF lere ait 3 adet yedek Lion Pilin bulunduğunun kontrolü * El VHF lerinin çalışır durumda olduklarının kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ KONTROL EDİLDİ KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ İYİ İYİ	04.11.2014 04.11.2014 04.11.2014	CHF.OFF
9	AKÜLER	Akülerin kontrolü	KONTROL EDİLDİ	İYİ	04.11.2014	CHF.OFF

KAPTAN

ANNEX-5: Certificate That Rescue Boat Davit Is Examined and Found Suitable

YILMAZ DENİZCİLİK
NAKLİYAT VE GEMİ SAN. TİC. LTD. ŞTİ.

Postane Mah. Rauf Orbay Cad. 2. Yasemin Sok. No:14 Tuzla / ISTANBUL - TURKEY
Tel : +90 216 395 98 42 - 446 39 20 - 446 39 21 Fax : +90 216 446 39 22
www.yilmazdenizcilik.com e-mail : info@yilmazdenizcilik.com



Ö.ÇETİNKAYA DENİZCİLİK TRANSPORT VE TİC.LTD.ŞTİ.

MANUFACTURER CERTIFICATE OF RESCUE BOAT DAVIT
KURTARMA BOTU MATAFORASI ÜRETİCİ SERTİFİKASI

Certificate Number : YDGS 10 - 005 / 11
Sertifika Numarası

Name of Vessel *Gemi Adı*	: M/V GÖKBEL	Date of Manufacture *Üretim Tarihi*	: 2011
Call Sign *Çağrı İşareti*	: TCZY 4	Static Proof Test Load (kg) *Statik Test Yükü*	: 3300
IMO Number *IMO Numarası*	: 9605712	Dynamic Test Load (kg) *Dinamik Test Yükü*	: 1650
Gross Tonnage *Gros Ton*	: 2120	Safety Working Load (kg) *Emniyetli Çalışma Yükü*	: 1500
Port of Registry *Bağlama Limanı*	: İSTANBUL	Static Brake Test Load (kg) *Statik Fren Test Yükü*	: 2250
Type of Vessel *Gemi Tipi*	: GEN.CARGO	Lowering *İndirme*	: 1500
Type of Davit *Matafora Tipi*	: YDGS 10	Hoisting *Kaldırma*	: 1050
Serial Number of Davit *Mataforanın Seri Numarası*	: 005/ 11	Power (HP) *Güç Ünitesi*	: 3.0

This is to certify that the mentioned Rescue Boat Davit which manufactured by Yılmaz Denizcilik, meets the latest SOLAS standards, LSA code Res. MSC.48(66) and IMO Resolution MSC.81(70), as amended to date.

Bu sertifika Yılmaz Denizcilik tarafından üretilen Kurtarma Botu Mataforasının en son SOLAS kurallarına, LSA kod Res.MSC.48(66) ve IMO Resolution MSC.81(70) gereklerine uygun üretildiğini belgelemektedir.

Type Approval Certificate (numbered 08.00140.272) issued by Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (IACS Member) on 14.04.2008

08.00140.272 numaralı Tip onay sertifikası Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (IACS Üyesi) tarafından 14.04.2008 tarihinde düzenlenmiştir.

This certificate issued on 25.08.2011
Bu sertifika 25.08.2011 tarihinde düzenlenmiştir.

YILMAZ DENİZCİLİK NAK. VE GEMİ SAN. TİC. LTD. ŞTİ.

ISO 9001:2008

MEYER

YILMAZ DENİZCİLİK NAKLİYAT VE GEMİ SAN. TİC. LTD. ŞTİ
Rauf Orbay Cad. 2. Yasemin Sok. No:14 TUZLA /İSTANBUL TÜRKİYE
Phn :+(90) 216 3959842 / 4463920 Fax:(90) 216 4463922

ISO 9001 REGISTERED FIRM — UKAS QUALITY MANAGEMENT 054

TARİH / DATE : 25/08/2011 **NUMARASI / NUMBER : YDGS 21- 117/11**

Bu belge T.C. Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı İSTANBUL Bölge Müdürlüğü'nün 08 / 02 / 2007 Tarih ve 2006 / 34 / 3858 - 08 - 02 sayılı Yetki Belgesi Tarafından SOLAS 74 (ve ekleri) Ch III Reg.20.11'e ve MSC.1/Cire.1206'ya uygun olarak can kurtarma araçlarının indirme donanımlarının ve yükte serbest bırakma tertibatlarının periyodik bakım, test ve kontrolü için düzenlenmiştir.

This Report is Issued by Turkish Prime Ministry Undersecretary's 2006 / 34 / 3858 - 08 - 02 Numbered and 08/02/2007 dated Authorization Certificate for Maritime Affairs District of ISTANBUL in accordance with SOLAS 74 (as ammended) Ch.III Reg.20.11 and MSC.1/Circ.1206 for the periodic servicing, testing and maintenance of survival crafts, launching appliances and on-load release gears.

İNDİRME DONANIMI LAUNCHING APPLIANCES				CAN KURTARMA ARACI SURVIVAL CRAFT				YÜKTE SERBEST BIRAKMA TERTİBATI ON-LOAD RELEASE GEAR	
[X] MATAFORA DAVIT	[ ] KREYN CRANE	[ ] FREEFALL FREEFALL		[ ] FİLİKA LIFEBOAT	[X] KURT. BOTU RESCUE BOAT	[ ] CANSALI LIFERAFT		[X] VAR AVAİL.	[ ] YOK N/A

Denize indirme donanımları (freefall hariç) ve yükte serbest bırakma tertibatları her 5 yılda 1.1 ağırlıkla dinamik teste ve ayrıntılı tetkike tabi tutulacaktır.
Launching appliances (except freefall) and on-load release gears are subject to dynamic test with 1.1 load and thorough examination at least once every 5 years

Firma Adı	/ Owner Name	Ö.ÇETİNKAYA DENİZCİLİK - ÖMER ÇETİNKAYA
Gemi Adı	/ Name Of ship	MV GÖKBEL
IMO No	/ IMO No	9605712
Çağrı İşareti	/ Call Sign	TCZY 4
Bağlama Limanı	/ Port Of Registry	İSTANBUL
Groston	/ Gross Ton	2120

KURTARMA BOTUNA KONULAN AĞIRLIK WEIGHT TO BE PLACED IN RESCUE BOAT		
Kurtarma Botu ve teçhizatının ağırlığı	/ Weight of rescue boat and equipment (1)	650 Kg.
Mürettebat ve yolcu ağırlığı	/ Weight of crew / pass (82,5x6)	495 kg.
Toplam ağırlık (Kurtarma botu, teçhizat ve mürettebat)	/ Total weight (Rescue boat, equipment and crew) (2)	1145 kg.
% 10 off	/ 10 % off (3)	114,5 kg.
Toplam ağırlık	/ Total Weight	1259,5 kg.
Kurtarma botuna konulan ağırlık (3+2-1)	/ Weight to be placed in rescue boat	544,5 kg.

KURTARMA BOTU RESCUE BOAT	6 KİŞİLİK 6 PERSONS	Evet Yes	Hayır No	N/A
Can kurtarma aracının, tel halatların, mataforanın, vinçlerin, serbest bırakma kancalarının, bağlantı ve kilitlerin sertifikaları kontrol edildi ve uygun bulundu mu ? Certification of survival craft, wire falls, davits, winches, release gear hooks, links and shackles and found in order?		X		
Yukarıdaki ekipmanın kullanım ve bakım usullerine uygun olarak kontrolü yapıldı ve bakımlı bulundu mu ? Above mentioned equipments checked as per operational and maintenance routines and found in order ?		X		
Güverte jurnali can kurtarma aracının periyodik kontrol ve role taliminin teyidi açısından kontrol edildi mi ? Deck'log book checked for the confirmation of regular survival craft drills and periodical maintenance?		X		
Can kurtarma aracının suya inişinde, yüklü/yüksüz serbest bırakma tertibatının çalışıp çalışmadığı testedildi mi? Survival craft lowered to just clean of water and on-load / off-load release gear tested ?		X		
Vinç ve frenin maksimum iniş hızında sert bir şekilde frenleyerek testi yapıldı mı ? Winch and break tested by applying the hand brake sharply at maximum lowering speed?		X		
Yapılar, bloklar, teller, kurtarma kancaları, bağlantılar, zincirler ve kilitler testten sonra kontrol edildi mi ? Foundation, blocks, falls, release gear hooks, tie-bands, link and shackles inspected after the test		X		
Vinç açılıp incelendi mi ? Winch opened and inspected?		X		
Yüklü çabuk kurtarma tertibatı : On-load release gear :		X		
Yukarıdaki testlerden önce testle bağlantılı olarak yükte serbest bırakma tertibatının bakımı yapıldı mı ? Before the above test, have the on/off-load release gears been overhauled in connection with testing?		X		
Kim tarafından ? By whom?	MUHAMMET GENÇ			
Yukarıdaki bahsedilen kişi kurtarma tertibatı için yetkilendirilmiş kişimidir Is the above mentioned personel authorized for the release gear system		X		
Düşünceler : Remarks				

Bu rapor 25.08.2011 tarihinde İstanbul'da düzenlenmiştir.
This report is issued at İstanbul on the day of 25.08.2011

Bu rapor 25.08.2016 tarihine kadar geçerlidir.
This report is valid until 25.08.2016

YILMAZ DENİZCİLİK NAK. VE GEMİ SAN. TİC. LTD. ŞTİ
İmza / Mühür
Sign / Stamp

YILMAZ DENİZCİLİK NAKLİYAT VE GEMİ SAN. TİC. LTD. ŞTİ
Rauf Orbay Cad. 2. Yasemin Sok. No:14 TUZLA /İSTANBUL TÜRKİYE
Phn :+(90) 216 3959842 / 4463920 Fax:(90) 216 4463922

RESCUE BOAT DAVIT TEST CERTIFICATE
KURTARMA BOTU MATAFORASI TEST SETİFİKASI

CERTIFICATE NUMBER / SERTİFİKA NUMARASI	YDGS 50 / 055-14	DATE / TARİH	21.11.2014

This Report is issued by Turkish Prime Ministry Undersecretary's 2006 / 34 / 3858 - 08 - 02 Numbered and 08 / 02 / 2007 dated Authorization Certificate for Maritime Affairs District of Istanbul in accordance with SOLAS 74 (as amended) Ch.III Reg.20.11 and MSC.1/Circ.1206 for the periodic servicing, testing and maintenance of survival crafts,launching appliances and on-load release gears.

Bu belge T.C Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı İSTANBUL Bölge Müdürlüğü'nün 08 / 02 / 2007 Tarih ve 2006 / 34 / 3858 - 08 - 02 sayılı Yetki Belgesi Tarafından SOLAS 74 (ve ekleri) Ch.III Reg.20 11and MSC 1/Circ.1206'ya uygun olarak can kurtarma araçlarının indirme donanımlarının ve yükte serbest bırakma tertibatlarının periyodik bakım, test ve kontrolü için düzenlenmiştir.

Through examination and overload testing of launching appliances / winch brakes and off-load release gear Rescue Boat / Life Boat at least every 1 years.

Denize indirme aparatları/vinç frenlerinin fazla yük testi ve ayrıntılı tetkiki ve kurtarma filikalarının yüksüz durumdaki çabuk kurtarma tertibatının en az her 1 yılda bir yapılan testleri

Owner Name / Firma Adı	: Ö.ÇETİNKAYA DENİZCİLİK - ÖMER ÇETİNKAYA
Name Of ship / Gemi Adı	: M/V GÖKBEL
IMO No / IMO Numarası	: 9605712
Call Sign / Çağrı İşareti	: TCZY 4
Port Of Registry / Bağlama Limanı	: İSTANBUL
Gross Ton / Groston	: 2120

CHECK LIST / KONTROL LİSTESİ	YES / EVET	NO / HAYIR
Winch and brake tested by applying the hand brakes sharply at maximum lowering speed? Vinç ve fren maksimum iniş hızında sert el freni ile test edildi mi?	✓	
Rescue Boat Winch opened and inspected? Kurtarma Botu Vinci açılıp test edildi mi?	✓	
Operational and maintenence routines of the above checked and found in order? Yukarıdaki kullanım ve tamir usullerinin kontrolü yapıldı mı ve düzenli bulundu mu?	✓	
Deck log book checked for confirmation of regular lifeboats drills? Güverte jurnali can filikalarının periyodik kontrollerinin teyidi açısından kontrol edildi mi?	✓	
Foundations, blocks, falls, hooks, tie-bands, links and shackles inspected after tested? Yapılar, bloklar, indirmeler, kancalar, bağlantılar, zincirler ve kilitler testten sonra kontrol edildi mi?	✓	
Certification of wire falls, winches, hooks,links and shackles checked and found in order? Halatların, mataforaların, vinçlerin, kancaların, zincirlerin ve kilitlerin sertifikaları kontrol edildimi ve düzenli bulundu mu?	✓	
Before the above tests, have the release hooks been checked ? Yukardaki testlerden önce, serbest bırakma kancaları kontrol edildi mi ?	✓	
By Whom ? Kim tarafından	MUHAMMET GENÇ	
Is above mentioned personnel is authorized for the life boat davit's maintenance ? Yukarıda bahsedilen kişi matafora bakımının yapılması için yetkilendirilmiş bir personel midir ?	✓	

This report is issued on 21.11.2014
Bu rapor 21.11.2014 tarihinde düzenlenmiştir.

This report is valid until 21.11.2015
Bu rapor 21.11.2015 tarihine kadar geçerlidir.

Sign / İmza

ANNEX-6 : Annual Plan of GÖKBEL Drills

Ö.ÇETİNKAYA	DENİZCİLİK TRANSPORT ve TİCARET LTD. Ş		
EMNİYETLİ YÖNETİM SİSTEMİ / *SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM*			F 08.01
ROLE TALİMLERİ YILLIK PLANI			
Yayınlayan/*Issued by* Y.K./D.P.A	Onaylayan/*Approved by* Genel Müdür/Gen.Mngr	Tarih/*Date* 01.01.2014	Yayın/*Issue* 1	Sayfa/*Page* 1 of 1

ROLE TALİMLERİ YILLIK PLANI

F 08.01

2014 YILI TALİM PROGRAMI

NO	İSMİ	REF.	OCAK	ŞUBAT	MART	NİSAN	MAYIS	HAZİRAN	TEMMUZ	AGUSTOS	EYLÜL	EKİM	KASIM	ARALIK
1	YANGINLA MÜCADELE	KRİZ KARTI 2												
2	GEMİ TERK	GEMİ TAL. 49/71	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	DENİZE ADAM DÜŞTÜ	KRİZ KARTI 4												
4	DÜMEN ARIZASI	GEMİ TAL. 44/71												
5	DENİZ KİRLİLİĞİ ÖNLEME	KRİZ KARTI 5												
6	KORSANLIKLA MÜCADELE	GEMİ TALİMATLARI MANUELİNE BAKINİZ (KRİZ KARTI 12)												
7	GEMİDE ACİL TIBBİ YARDIM	KRİZ KARTI 11												
8	GEMİNİN ÇATIŞMASI	KRİZ KARTI 6												
9	GEMİNİN OTURMASI	KRİZ KARTI 10												
10	YEDEKTE ÇEKİLME VE ÇEKME	GEMİ TAL. 54/71												
11	ANA MAKİNA ARIZASI	KRİZ KARTI 3												

SEKLİNDE İŞARETLİ OLANLAR ŞİRKET VE GEMİ ARASINDA ORTAK OLARAK YAPILACAKTIR.

X İŞARETLİ AYLARDA KURTARMA BOTU/ FİLİKA DENİZE İNDİRİLECEKTİR.

BU PLAN ILE ILGILI KAYITLAR GEMI EGITIM/TALIM OZETI FORMUNA YAZILACAKTIR.
GEMI-SIRKET ARASI TALIMLER PROSEDURU UYGUN OLARAK DOLDURULACAKTIR. BAKINIZ SIRKET MANUELI BOLUM 8.5

ANNEX- 7: GÖKBEL Abandonment Drill Record

Ö.ÇETİNKAYA DENİZCİLİK TRANSPORT ve TİCARET LTD. ŞTİ.				
EMNİYETLİ YÖNETİM SİSTEMİ / *SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM*				F 08.02
TALİM KAYITLARI FORMU				
Yayınlayan / *Issued by*	Onaylayan / *Approved by*	Tarih / *Date*	Yayın / *Issue*	Sayfa / *Page*
Y.K. / *D.P.A.*	Genel Müdür / *Gen. Mngr.*	01.02.2013	1	1 of 1

TALİM KAYITLARI FORMU

M/V GÖKBEL TARİH:19.11 10 00-11 30 LT.

1. Yapılan eğitimin / talimin konusu:GEMİYİ TERK

2. Eğitimin / talimin konu başlıkları
GEMİ PERSOLENINN %90 I DEGİSMESİ UZERINE CAN SALLARININ
VE MALZEMELERİN TANITIMI.

3. Eğitimin / talimin özeti :YANGIN ALARMI VE AŞANEDE YANGIN ANOSU İLE
PERSONEL SALONDA TOPLANDI.
ROLE KARTLARI KONTROL EDİLDİ.CANSALLARININ YERİ GOSTERILDI.
RESCUE BOT CALIŞTIRILARAK DENİZE İNDİRİLDİ.

4. Eğitime / talime katılan personel :

ADI SOYADI	GÖREVİ	İMZA
MELIH EREK	CHF.OFF.	
GENÇ OSMAN SABUNCU	2.ND.OFF	
M.ALİ GUNDUZ	CHF.ENG.	
YİĞİT KUCUKBIYIK	2.ENG.	
ZEYNEL USTUN	A/B	
UFUK GULCEMAL	A/B	
HASAN TIRYAKI	O/S	
MUSTAFA B.ÖZTÜRK	EN.CAD.	
EMRAH KARADAŞ	OİLER	
BAYRAM ARSLAN	COOK	

5. Eğitimin / talimin sonucu :
TALİM YENİ KATILAN PERSONELİN GEMİ YANGIN MALZEMELERINI TANITILMASI
VE AŞİNA OLMASI AÇISINDAN FAYDALI OLMUŞTUR.

6. Tespit edilen eğitim / talim ihtiyaçları : YOKTUR

Talimi / eğitimi veren : II.KAPTAN MELİH EREK MASTER

ANNEX- 8: GÖKBEL Abandonment Drill Record

Ö.ÇETİNKAYA DENİZCİLİK TRANSPORT ve TİCARET LTD. ŞTİ.				
EMNİYETLİ YÖNETİM SİSTEMİ / *SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM*				F 08.02
TALİM KAYITLARI FORMU				
Yayınlayan / *Issued by*	Onaylayan / *Approved by*	Tarih / *Date*	Yayın / *Issue*	Sayfa / *Page*
Y.K. / *D.P.A.*	Genel Müdür / *Gen. Mngr.*	01.02.2013	1	1 of 1

TALİM KAYITLARI FORMU

M/V GÖKBEL TARİH:21.11/2014 13.10-13.45 LT.

1. Yapılan eğitimin / talimin konusu:GEMİYİ TERK

2. Eğitimin / talimin konu başlıkları
TUZLA TERSANE SINDE İSTANBUL LİMAN BŞK.LIĞI PSC.TARAFINDAN VERİLEN GEMİYI TERK TALİMİ

3. Eğitimin / talimin özeti :
GEMİYİ TERK ALARMI ILE BIRLIKTE PERSONEL MUSTER STATIONDA TOPLANDI,YANINA GETİRECEĞİ MALZEMELER VE ROLE KARTLARI KONTROL EDİLDİ.
RESCUE BOT MOTORU ÇALIŞTIRILDI VE DENİZ SEVİYESİNE İNDİRİLEREK TEKRAR YERİNE ALINDI.

4. Eğitime / talime katılan personel :

ADI SOYADI	GÖREVİ	İMZA
MELIH EREK	CHF.OFF.	
GENÇ OSMAN SABUNCU	2.ND.OFF	
M.ALİ GUNDUZ	CHF.ENG.	
YİĞİT KUCUKBIYIK	2.ENG.	
ZEYNEL USTUN	A/B	
HASAN ALPER	A/B	
HASAN TIRYAKİ	O/S	
MUSTAFA B.ÖZTÜRK	EN.CAD.	
EMRAH KARADAŞ	OİLER	
BAYRAM ARSLAN	COOK	

5. Eğitimin / talimin sonucu :
PERSONELIN GEMİYİ TERK REAKSIYONUNUN GORULMESI AÇISINDAN FAYDALI OLMUŞTUR.

6. Tespit edilen eğitim / talim ihtiyaçları : YOKTUR

Talimi / eğitimi veren : II.KAPTAN MELİH EREK MASTER

ANNEX-9: LADY AZIZA'S Electronic Navigation Aids

RECORD OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE CARGO SHIP SAFETY EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATE (FORM E) NO. **1411065FE**

NAME OF SHIP: **LADY AZIZA** IMO NO.: **8917716**

3 DETAILS OF NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT

	Item	Actual provision
1.1	Standard magnetic compass[2]	FITTED
1.2	Spare magnetic compass[2]	--
1.3	Gyro compass[2]	FITTED
1.4	Gyro compass heading repeater[2]	FITTED
1.5	Gyro compass bearing repeater[2]	--
1.6	Heading or track control system[2]	FITTED
1.7	Pelorus or compass bearing device[2]	PROVIDED
1.8	Means of correcting heading and bearings	PROVIDED
1.9	Transmitting heading device (THD)[2]	--
2.1	Nautical charts / ~~Electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS)~~[3]	PROVIDED
2.2	Back up arrangements for ECDIS	--
2.3	Nautical publications	PROVIDED
2.4	Back up arrangements for electronic nautical publications	--
3.1	Receiver for a global navigation satellite system / ~~terrestrial radionavigation system~~[2, 3]	FITTED
3.2	9 GHz radar[2]	FITTED
3.3	Second radar (3 GHz / ~~9 GHz~~[3])[2]	FITTED
3.4	Automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA)[2]	--
3.5	Automatic tracking aid[2]	--
3.6	Second automatic tracking aid[2]	--
3.7	Electronic plotting aid[2]	--
4.1	Automatic identification system (AIS)	FITTED
4.2	Long-Range identification and tracking system	FITTED
5.1	Voyage data recorder (VDR)[3]	--
5.2	Simplified voyage data recorder (S-VDR)[3]	FITTED
6.1	Speed and distance measuring device (through the water)[2]	--
6.2	Speed and distance measuring device (over the ground in the forward and athwartships direction)[2]	--
7	Echo sounding device[2]	FITTED
8.1	Rudder, propeller, thrust, pitch and operational mode indicator[2]	FITTED
8.2	Rate-of-turn indicator[2]	--
9	Sound reception system[2]	--
10	Telephone to emergency steering position[2]	FITTED
11	Daylight signalling lamp[2]	FITTED
12	Radar reflector[2]	--
13	International Code of Signals	PROVIDED
14	IAMSAR Manual, Volume III	PROVIDED
15	Bridge navigational watch alarm system (BNWAS)	FITTED

This is to Certify that this Record is correct in all respects.

Issued at **TRIPOLI - LEBANON** on **03.12.2014**

CAPT. G. GEORGES
DROMON BUREAU OF SHIPPING